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THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CATEGORY IS... ABORTION
PROTEST: UNTED STATES V LYNCH,' THE UNITED STATES'
APPEAL FROM A CRIMINAL ACQUITTAL IN THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
No person shall... be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb[.]2

[It is] painfully clear that no legal rule or doctrine is safe
from ad hoc nullification . . .when an occasion for its
3
application arises in a case involng... abortion.

I.

INTODUCTION

If one asked the average American if a prosecutor can appeal a
criminal acquittal, she4 might likely reply: "No, that would be Double
Jeopardy." And, most of us would accept that answer. But what if one
asked a law student or, better, a law professor the same question. A
likely answer would be: "Of course not, the defendant is free after an
1. United States v. Lynch, 952 F. Supp. 167 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), appealdismissed, 162
F.3d 732 (2d Cir. 1998) (2-1 decision), reh'g denied and reh'g en banc denied, 181 F.3d 330
(2d Cir. 1999) (6-6 decision).
2. U.S. CoNsr. amend. V. For a well written essay on the DoubleJeopardy Clause
see, Akhil Reed Amar, DoubleJeopardy Law Made Simple, 106 YALE L.J. 1807 (1997). For
an in-depth study of the Clause and a proposal for harmonizing double jeopardy jurisprudence see George C. Thomas III, DOUBLEJEOPARD: THE HISTORY, THE LAw (1998).

3. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747, 814 (1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See also Lynch, 181 F.3d at 331 (Sack, J.,
concurring) ("[The Government's] efforts have been so expert and extensive that it
may truly be said that the full force of the prosecutorial machinery of the United States
government has been summoned here to seek to assure that these two defendants are
convicted and punished. This for an alleged crime the maximum sentence for which
was a modest fine and six months in jail.").
4. The author attempts to be gender inclusive by using gender-neutral criteria to
choose gender-laden pronouns. In this instance, the majority ofAmericans are female,
so the comment reads: "she." Gender-neutral terms will be used as well.
Good writers often assert that these methods can be "distracting." ALAN L. DWORSKY, THE LrrnmE BooK ON LEGAL WRrING 25 (2d ed. 1992); RicHARD C. WvYlCK,PLAIN
ENGLISH FOR IAwYERs 79 (4th ed. 1998). The author agrees. But, with a little effort,

writers can and should "find ways to express [their] ideas in nonsexist ways, even at the
cost of a little wordiness." JOSEPH M. WiLUIAms, ST=Im 194 (1990).
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acquittal. An appeal would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause." And,
most of us would receive that answer as a sound restatement of the law,
as well. But is it?
In 1970, Congress amended the Criminal Appeals Act 5 to, inter
alia, "authorize government appeals whenever consistent with the
Double Jeopardy Clause [.]6 This gave the Government "something
new[:] the ability to appeal in criminal cases to the Constitutional limits." 7 The Constitutional limits, however, "were not new."8
One limit the Double Jeopardy Clause imposes is absolute and
well-settled: "the government cannot appeal a jury's acquittal." 9 In
short, the jury's verdict is sacrosanct and final. But when ajudge sits as
the trier of both fact and law, different standards are employed even
though the "Double Jeopardy Clause . . . nowhere distinguishes between bench and jury trials." 10
In 1975, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Wilson" and
United States v. Jenkins'2 to refine its precedent on "the application of
the Double Jeopardy Clause . . . to Government appeals in criminal
cases." 13 Wilson and Jenkins, 'jurisprudential bookends," a4 speak to appeals from jury trials and from bench trials, respectively. Not surprisingly, Wilson, which governs appeals from jury trials, rests on a clear,
bright-line rule. But Jenkins, which governs appeals from bench trials,
is not so commendable. Its rule is poorly articulated and, therefore,
ripe for manipulation.
Wilson establishes that "when a judge rules in favor of the defendant after a verdict of guilty has been entered by the trier of fact, the
Government may appeal from that ruling without running afoul of the
Double Jeopardy Clause. ' 15 Under Wilson, an appellate court orders
5.
18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1999).
6. United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 366 (1975).
7. Lynch, 162 F.3d at 736-37 (quoting United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 338
(1975)); see also Wilson, 420 U.S. at 337 ("Congress ... with the new Criminal Appeals
Act... intended to remove all statutory barriers to Government appeals and to allow
appeals whenever the Constitution [permits.]").
8. Lynch, 162 F.3d at 737 (emphasis added).
9. Id. at 738 (Sack, J., concurring).
10. Jenkins, 420 U.S. at 365.
11. 420 U.S. at 332.
12. 420 U.S. at 358.
13. Id. at 359.
14. Lynch, 162 F.3d at 739 (Sack, J., concurring); id. ("It is significant that Wilson
and Jenkins were decided the same day[.").
15.
Wilson, 420 U.S. at 353 (emphasis added).
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"judgment... entered on [a] verdict"' 6 already rendered. In effect,
an appellate tribunal merely corrects post-verdict legal error by the
trial judge rather than instituting its own finding of guilt.
Similarly, the Court in Jenkins suggested in dicta that, after a
bench trial, an appellate court may be able to "sift"1 7 a district court's

findings of fact in order to determine whether "the [district] court's
finding of 'not guilty' is attributable to an erroneous conception of the
law whereas the court has resolved against the defendant all of the
factual issues necessary to support a finding of guilt under the correct
legal standard.' 8 Although a Jenkins sifting has never been used to
reverse an acquittal, 19 presumably an appellate tribunal could order a
district court to enter ajudgment of conviction upon a sifting that satisfied the Jenkins standard.
In 1999, a divided panel of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in United States v. Lynch,20 rejected the
United States' request to conduct a Jenkins sifting and overturn an acquittal. That litigation is the focus of this comment.
Part II of this comment traces the factual background of the Lynch
case. 2 ' Part III examines the opinion of the district court that acquitted the defendants of criminal contempt 22 Part IV-A of this comment
reviews the controlling Supreme Court and Second Circuit precedent
for an appeal from a criminal acquittal: United States v. Wilson,23 United
States v. Jenkins,2 4 and Jenkins' progeny in the Second Circuit, United
16. Jenkins, 420 U.S. at 365.
17. Id. at 367.
18. Id.
19. See Lynch, 162 F.3d at 740 (Sack, J., concurring).
Between July 1971, the year after the Criminal Appeals Act was passed, and
June 1997, the last year for which statistics are available, there were 42,565
criminal bench trials in the federal district courts, 11,488 of them ending in
an acquittal. 1972-1997 ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. Table D-7....
Not a single one of those appears to have been overturned on appeal.
Id.; see also, Deborah Pines, UnprecedentedReversal ofAcquittals Sought, N.Y.LJ., September
11, 1998 at 1 ("'Has there ever been a case of a reversal after an acquittal' since 1791?,
asked (Judge Sack.] [AUSA] Siegel conceded, 'No.'").
20. 952 F. Supp. 167 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), appeal dismissed, 162 F.3d 732 (2d Cir. 1998)
(2-1 decision), reh'g denied and reh'g en banc denie, 181 F.3d 330 (2d Cir. 1999) (6-6
decision).

21.
22.
23.
24.

See infra pp. 236-40.
See infra pp. 240-47.
See infra p. 248.
See infra pp. 248-50.
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States v. Fayer.25 Part IV-B of this comment examines the panel and en
26
banc opinions of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.
This comment then concludes, in Part V, that the Second Circuit
correctly dismissed the appeal and that the Circuit Court dissenters
misread controlling precedent and attempted to fashion unworkable,
27
overbroad standards of review repugnant to the Constitution.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On February 23, 1996, after more than one-thousand arrests of
pro-life2 8 demonstrators during over eight years of protest at the
Women's Medical Pavilion ("WMP") in Dobbs Ferry, New York, Judge
John E. Sprizzo entered a permanent injunction prohibiting, inter alia,
George Lynch and Christopher Moscinski from violating the Freedom
of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994 ("FACE").29
Six months later, on August 24, 1996,Judge Sprizzo held Lynch in
civil contempt for conducting driveway vigils at the WMP, in violation
25.
See infra p. 250.
26. See infra pp. 250-75.
27. See infra pp. 275-78.
28. This comment employs the terms "pro-life" and "pro-choice," since these are
the terms the two movements most often use to describe themselves.
29. The FACE Act provides in relevant part:
(a) Prohibited activities. -Whoever(1) by force or threat or force by physical obstruction, intentionally
injures, intimidates, or interferes with or attempts to injure, intimidate or interfere with any person because that person is or has
been, or in order to intimidate such person or any other person or
any class of person from, obtaining or providing reproductive
health services; ....
Shall be subject to the penalties provided in
subsection (b) and the civil remedies provided in subsection (c)
(b) Penalties. -Whoever violates this section shall(1) in the case of a first offence, be fined in accordance with this title,
or imprisoned not more than one year, or both;...
(c) Civil remedies.(1) Right of Action.(A) In General. - Any person aggrieved by reason of the conduct
prohibited by subsection (a) may commence a civil action for
the relief set forth in subparagraph (B), except that such an
action may be brought under subsection (a) (1) only by a person involved in providing or seeking to provide, or obtaining
or seeking to obtain, services in a facility that provides reproductive health services...
18 U.S.C. § 248 (1994).
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of the court's injunction.3 0 Coincidentally, later the same day, Lynch,
a retired Roman Catholic Bishop, 3 ' and Moscinski, a young Franciscan
friar,3 2 returned to "their spot"3 in the WMP's driveway to pray the
35
Rosary3 4 for an end to abortion.
30. See United States v. Lynch, 162 F.3d 732, 741 (2d Cir. 1998) (Feinberg, J.,
dissenting).
31. Apparently Bishop Lynch was not difficult to identify as religious. One arrest
report reads: "Attire: Priest clothing." Record at 262.
32. Father BenedictJ. Groeschel was in the driveway as well, but was not a party to
the injunction. Id. at 362.
33. Lynch, 162 F.3d at 733.
34. [Defense Counsel]: You were praying the Rosary, and for the benefit of
the Court, maybe you can just describe the significance of the prayer.
[Lynch]: Well, the Rosary is simply a combination of different prayers, specifically the Hail Mary [and] the Our Father.... Simply, the idea is to unite
our wills with the will of God in asking for His grace for whatever needs we
might have....
Q. How does this prayer, in your view, have the power to change the minds
and hearts of women seeking abortion or for those involved in that?
A. It's a very powerful prayer, because the intercession of Our Lady is very,
very powerful. Chiefly the effect that it has, I think, is obtaining the grace
for the mothers and the fathers and the families going there. The grace to
have a conversion, namely, to love the children that they are carrying and
not to have them aborted....
Q. Let me ask you about that last phrase "at the hour of our death." Did
you find it important that day at Dobbs Ferry to be at that location with
your Rosary and your image of Our Lady of Guadalupe?
A. Absolutely. It was of crucial importance to be there that day, mainly
because that was where what I believe the criminal act of murder was taking
place, and our prayer for witness was required to be there. In a sense, as
Jesus said, "Whatever you do to the least of my brothers you do to me." And
the least of our brothers are the unborn children. So, when we butcher
them through abortion, it is almost as if the Crucifixion ofJesus is happening over and over again. So our attitude there is that of being even at Calvary and witnessing again [the] Crucifixion and, in some sense, trying to
bring an end to this horrible evil.
Record at 379-81.
35. Moscinski, in a television interview, would later explain:
[T] he judge, because of our [previous driveway protest activities] issued an
injunction forbidding us to [protest in that way] again. Our own position is
that we have an obligation [based on the divine law and the natural law] to
defend human life and there's no law-or court decision-which could interfere with that obligation....
[T]here is, ultimately, a higher law than our Constitution. Because ... the
FACE law[,] which protects the killing of innocent children, . . . is contrary
to the natural law, which guarantees the right to life, than that law (FACE)
is invalid and not binding.
A Landmark Decisionfor Conscious (EWTN television broadcast, 1996).
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Dobbs Ferry Police officers were called to the scene and observed
"several vehicles unsuccessfully attempt to enter the parking lot."36
The officers told Lynch and Moscinski they were violating the law, and
that if they did not leave the driveway, they would be arrested. 3 7 Lynch
and Moscinski acknowledged the warning, but did not move. The pair
were arrested,38 charged by the government with contempt of the
court's injunction, 39 and, after a bench trial, were acquitted of crimi40
nal contempt.
Here, Moscinski relies on natural law principles that have long influenced Western
Civilization. See, e.g., WILLIAM EBENSTEIN AND ALAN 0. EBENSTEIN EDS., GREAT POLrnC-.,L
THINKERS 16 (5th ed. 1991) ("A rational faculty common to all humanity, the Stoics
argued, also implies the existence of universal law andjustice. This concept of a natural
law became, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, one of the leading political
doctrines."); CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, pp. 2270-75 (1994) ("Since the first
century the Church has affirmed the moral evil of every procured abortion. This teaching has not changed and remains unchangeable[: procured abortion] is gravely contrary to the moral law."); 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 39 ("Man, considered
as a creature, must necessarily be subject to the laws of his creator, for he is entirely a
dependent being. [T] he [Creator's] will.. .is called the law of nature."); THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("We hold these Truths to be self-evident,
that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of
Happiness[.]").
Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., subscribed to the natural law philosophy:
There are just laws and there are unjust laws. I would be the first to advocate obeying just laws. One has not only a legal but a moral responsibly to
obey just laws. Conversely, one has a moral responsibility to disobey unjust
laws. I would agree with Saint Augustine that "An unjust law is no law at
all."
Now what is the difference between the two? How does one determine
when a law is just or unjust? A just law is a man-made code that squares
with the moral law or the law of God. An unjust law is a code that's out of
harmony with the moral law. To put it in the terms of Saint Thomas Aquinas, an unjust law is a human law that is not rooted in eternal and natural
law. Any law that uplifts human personality is just. Any law that degrades
human personality is unjust.
REv. DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., LETTER FROM A BIRMINGHAM JAIL, quoted in, R-J.
HENLE, in ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, THE TREATISE ON LAW 328 (R.J. Henle ed., 1993).
36.
37.

United States v. Lynch, 952 F. Supp. 167, 168 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
See id.

38. See id.
39. See id.
40. To prove criminal contempt, the government must "prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) the court entered a reasonably specific order; (2) [the defendants]
knew of that order; (3) [the defendants] violated that order; and (4) [their] violation
was willful." United States v. Lynch, 162 F.3d 732, 734 n.2 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing United
States v. Cutler, 58 F.3d 825, 834 (2d Cir. 1995)).
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Troubled that Bishop Lynch and Brother Moscinski were charged
based on conduct "at the outmost limit of what [FACE] would constitutionally reach,"4 1 and impressed that the two held "sincere, genuine,
objectively based, and . . . conscience-driven religious belieflIs],"42
Judge Sprizzo found "beyond a reasonable doubt,"43 that "neither
Lynch nor Moscinski acted with the willfulness which criminal contempt requires."44
Judge Sprizzo further asserted that "even assuming arguendo ...
the court was satisfied that the Government's proof established the
requisite willfulness, the court would still find the defendants not
guilty." 45 This was, needless to say, controversial. Judge Sprizzo asserted that he would have "exercise[d] the prerogative of leniency
which a fact-finder has to refuse to convict a defendant, even if the
46
circumstances would otherwise be sufficient to convict[.]"
After Lynch's and Moscinski's acquittal, pro-choice and pro-life
camps took predictable positions. Donna Lieberman, Director of the
New York Civil Liberties Union ("NYCLU") Reproductive Rights Project, called the decision "an invitation to opponents of abortion to

Record at 193. The judge used foil characters to make his point:
I saw no resistance [by Lynch and Moscinski] to the police, as there was
even back in the '60s when civil rights demonstrators were being arrested,
kicking and yelling. Actually, there was more yelling going on by a prochoice protestor at the scene than there was for [Lynch and Moscinski].
Md at 400. Apparently the government agreed that behavior like Lynch's and Moscinski's was not the genesis of the FACE Act:
THE COURT: This case is at the borders of what Congress was intending to
protect. I think it is very clear from the legislative history, even if the statute
is constitutional, that this kind of conduct is not the kind of conduct that
Congress had primarily in mind. I read verbatim both reports of the legislative history. If the conduct which we are describing here were the only kind
of conduct which pro-lifers were engaging in, I doubt very seriously
whether the Congress would have ever passed the statute.
MR. SIEGEL: The government certainly would give you no argument on
that point.
Id at 196-97.
42. Lynch, 952 F. Supp at 170.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 171.
46. Id.
41.
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break the law and use their religious beliefs as insulations." 47 To her,
'4 8
and "scary."4 9
the decision was "off-the-wall
The New York Times Editorial Page called the ruling
"[d]angerous" 50 and perversely linked Lynch's and Moscinski's prayers
to "clinic bombings. '5 1 Responding to the Times editorial, defense
counsel Gabriel Kralik, called the decision "correct and capable of
study, '5 2 remarking that, "[Lynch and Moscinskil engaged only in exemplary peaceful protest,"5 3 which he characterized as "openly and
lovingly challeng[ing] liberal abortion laws that have resulted in the
violent deaths of more than 36 million infants in [the United States]
since 1967."

54

Legal and political implications aside, most agree with defense
counsel John Broderick's characterization ofJudge Sprizzo's decision:
"guts [y] .
III.

56

THE DIsTRICr COURT'S OPINION

After considering the contempt charges brought against Lynch
and Moscinski, Judge Sprizzo did his "duty" 57 and found Lynch and
Moscinski "not guilty."5 8 He found, "as a matter of fact," 59 that
47. Deborah Pines, Religious Beliefs a Shield in Contempt Case, N.Y.LJ., January 15,
1997, at 1. Pro-lifers agreed that the case could have coattails. See Hoffman, infra note
48 ("Walter Weber [of] the American Center for Law and Justice ...said the decision
'could have many implications for FACE."').
48. Jan Hoffman, Judge Acquits Abortion Protesters on Basis of Religious Beliefs, N.Y.
TIMES, January 19, 1997, § 1, at 25.
49. Id.
50. Editorial, A DangerousAbortion Protest Ruling, N.Y. T[ME, January 22, 1997, § A,
at 20.
51. Id. The TimEs' editorial staff was not alone in linking prayers to bombings.
Donna Lieberman, Director, Reproductive Rights Project, NYCLU: "[The decision] is
so close to the Atlanta bombings... " Hoffman, supra note 48 at 25. Randi Fallor,
Director, WMP: "Is it [now] OK... for them to place bombs in the clinic[?]" Id.
52. Gabriel P. Kralik, Respect Integrity of Peaceful Abortion Protest,N.Y. TIMEs, January
22, 1997, § A, at 30.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Pines, supra note 47.
56. United States v. Lynch, 952 F. Supp. 167 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
57. Record at 433 ("For the government's benefit, I will accept no further violations of my order as a related case.... Should there be a new violation, I have done my
duty by this case, and I don't want to make it a career.").
58. Lynch, 952 F. Supp. at 172.
59. Id. at 170.
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"[their] sincere, genuine, objectively based, and... conscience-driven
60
religious belief preclude [d] a finding of willfulness."
Judge Sprizzo, however, did not view the positive law as subservient to the divine 61 or natural law. 62 Instead, he viewed the positive law as embracing their conduct. On more than one occasion, he
balked at the suggestion of a natural law defense: "[T]his is not an
60. To define willfulness Judge Sprizzo relied on BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY. "Willful conduct, when used in the criminal context, generally means deliberate conduct

done with a bad purpose either to disobey or to disregard the law. See BAcK's LAW
DIcTONARY (5th ed. 1979). That kind of conduct is not present here." Id. It is clear
that Lynch and Moscinski's beliefs were sincere and genuine, but finding that their
beliefs were "objectively based" may raise some eyebrows.
During summation Judge Sprizzo and AUSA Martin Siegel engaged in a lengthy
discussion over the defense of justification. See Record at 389-97. The discussion was
largely based on whether the court could find that Lynch's and Moscinski's beliefs that
a "life [was] injeopardy[,]" and that "abortion is murder [were] ... objectively reasonable." Id. at 389. The court explained:
For the same reasons that the pro-choice people say that you can't prove
that it is a human being, for the very same reasons you can't prove that it is
not. Therefore, a person who believes that it is a human being is no more
unreasonable than a person who believes it is not.
Id. at 390. But the Government suggested that in order to determine "whether
[Lynch's and Moscinski's] views were objectively reasonable, [the court] would have to
look at the laws of the State of New York[.J" Id. at 392. Judge Sprizzo, who thought it
was a question for him as "a fact-finder," id. at 390, disagreed:
You don't look at the State of New York to define what is a human being.
You are wrong about that. New York only decided whether or not they will
make it a crime to kill an unborn child. That is what the abortion laws are
all about. That is what Roe v. Wade is all about. But the State of New York
has no greater authority. To quote Sir Thomas More, parliament [sic] hath
not the competence to do it... .You want me to be some divine lawgiver
that says the state has the right to define when life begins.
Id at 392-93. Judge Sprizzo's rationale, then, was because the justification statute provides that if one "act[s] in a reasonable belief that you are protecting the life of another
... human being," the defense ofjustification possibly could have been raised based on
the objective belief that they were protecting human life. He continued:
I would have to be convinced... that a belief which is shared by... perhaps 80 million people in this country, that an unborn child is human, is
objectively unreasonable[.] Beyond that, I would have real difficulty questioning the objective reasonableness of that belief, because I might be intruding upon the First Amendment even in going that far. But, in any
event, under the testimony that I have heard, does anybody question that
these people believe that the child is human, and can I say that that belief is
objectively unreasonable? I cannot. 80 million people share it.
Id- at 393-94.
61. See sources cited infra note 180.
62. See sources cited infra note 180.
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ecclesiastical court. I keep telling you that. It is Caesar's court."63 He
insisted that, if the case were tried to ajury and the defendants raised a
natural law defense, he "would have to tell the jury that [the] natural
64
law is [not a] defense . . . to the crime."
But the impact of religious belief on the case was not nil. In fact,
it was at least in part determinative of the analysis Judge Sprizzo employed to adjudge the case. "As far as [judge Sprizzo was] concerned," 65 the action "was obviously a speech case" 66 and the religionbased arguments were "First Amendment issue[s] and always [had]
been. '6 7 Ironically, he also viewed Lynch and Moscinski's arguments,
which he characterized as "conscience challenges," 68 as falling "within
the penumbra of privacy protected by Roe v. Wade."69
Grounded in negative implications though, Judge Sprizzo knew
his ruling was novel: "the Court is aware of no criminal contempt case
where a court has rejected a sincere religious belief as a defense to a
criminal contempt charge. 7 °
To buttress his ruling for an acquittal, Judge Sprizzo cited United
States v. Sisson,7 1 a Vietnam War-era conscientious objector case. Sis63. Record at 326. In a previous proceeding, Judge Sprizzo also rejected a natural
law defense: "That seal above my head says ... this is Caesar's court. This is not a
church, this is not a temple, this is not a mosque. And we don't live in a theocracy.
This is a court of law. I will look at all the legal issues." United States v. Lynch, 104 F.3d
357, 362 (1997) (quoting the previous proceeding).
64. Record at 329.
65.
Id. at 324-25.
66. Id. at 325.
67. Id. at 324-25. Judge Sprizzo may have merely been referring to the "obvious"
fact that "the First Amendment covers freedom of religion too," id. at 324, but the
context of his comments seems to indicate otherwise.
68.
Id. at 325.
69.
Id.
70.
United States v. Lynch, 952 F. Supp. 167, 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
71.
399 U.S. 267 (1970). It is possible thatJudge Sprizzo cited Sisson as a preemptive strike against a government appeal. At least the en banc dissenters thought so:
"[Had the en banc petition been granted] the court might have considered whether
the district court designed its decision as a 'factual' determination in an effort to insulate
the acquittal from appeal." Lynch, 181 F.3d at 337 n.10 (Cabranes,J., dissenting) (emphasis added). The record indicatesJudge Sprizzo was conscious of the practical implications of his ruling. See Record at 327 (The Court: "I guess ajudge can [nullify] if he is
sitting as a trier of fact. In a criminal case the Court of Appeals doesn't have the power
to review anything I do[.]"); id. at 338 (The Court: "I could do it [nullification]: Even if
they don't waive a jury, I can say, 'I find you not guilty.' And there is no appeal from
that if it is in criminal contempt."); id. at 431 (The Court: "The court does find as a
matter offact that [Lynch and Moscinski's] sincere, genuine, validly based and, indeed,
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son, who was not opposed to all wars, "felt the Vietnam war was 'immoral,' 'illegal,' and 'unjust."' 72 Refusing to elect conscientious
objector status 73 or submit to induction,74 Sisson was indicted for "'unlawfully, knowingly and willfully fail [ing,] neglect[ing] and refus[ing]
to perform a duty imposed [on him] by the Military Selective Service
75
Act of 1967 and its regulations."
The jury found Sisson guilty. However, the district judge, nominally at least, "arrested judgment" 76 and ruled that the "Constitution
prohibited the application of the 1967 Draft Act to Sisson... because
as a sincerely conscientious man, Sisson's interest in not killing in the
Vietnam Conflict outweighed the country's... need for him to be so
77
employed."
Judge Sprizzo viewed the case as supporting his decision because
"Sisson's sincere moral belief precluded his conviction."7 8 Judge
Sprizzo's reliance on Sisson was, however, a reliance on the district
judge's acquittal, as the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for want
79
of jurisdiction.
Then Judge Sprizzo went one step further, stating that "even assuming arguendo that the Court were satisfied that the Government's
proof established the requisite willfulness, the Court would still find
the defendants not guilty."8 0 He explained:
conscience-driven religious belief precludes a finding of willfulness."(emphasis
added)).
One commentator fears that, in the end, "Lynch reveals that when factual determinations are dispositive of legal outcomes, the Double Jeopardy Clause may create an
opportunity for judges to circumvent the law and precedent in favor of 'justice.'" Recent Case, Fifth Amendment-DoubleJeopardy Clause-Second CircuitRefuses to Review District Court's Acquittal of Defendants Charged With Violating Permanent Injunction-United
States v. Lynch, 181 F.3d 9330 (2d Cir. 1999), 113 HARv. L. REv. 1252 (2000).
72. Sisson, 399 U.S. at 271.
73. See id. at 274 n.2.
74. See id. at 271.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 270. But, the Supreme Court disagreed: "[W]e conclude that the decision below, depending as it does on facts developed at Sisson's trial, is not an arrest of
judgment but instead is a directed acquittal." Id.
77. Id. (citing United States v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp. 902, 910 (1969) (internal quotations omitted)).
78. United States v. Lynch, 952 F. Supp. 167, 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
79. See Sisson, 399 U.S. at 308; Lynch, 181 F.3d at 337 (Cabranes, J., dissenting)
("The [Sisson] Court... determined only that the acquittal was non-appealable under
the Criminal Appeals Act, not that [the district court] was correct.").
80. Lynch, 952 F. Supp. at 171.
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The facts presented here both by sworn testimony and a
videotape depicting an elderly bishop and a young monk
quietly praying with rosary beads in the Clinic's driveway,
clearly call for whatJudge Friendly once referred to... as
the prerogative of leniency, which a fact-finder has to refuse to convict a defendant, even if the circumstances
would otherwise be sufficient to convict. 81
To support the right to refuse to convict, Judge Sprizzo invoked
the legacy of the famous John Peter Zenger trial where three colonial
82
grand juries refused to indict and one trial jury refused to convict
Zenger. He then recalled the memories ofjuries who refused to convict colonial smugglers 8 3 in the Crown's courts, as well. 84 This support,
however, was limited to juries refusing to convict, notjudges.8 5 He did
not cite any case law respecting the same prerogative for judges8 6 and,
81. Id.; see also United States v. Barash, 365 F.2d 395, 403 (2nd Cir. 1966) ("... the
jury might not have exercised its prerogative of leniency. ... ." (emphasis added)).
82. Eugene Cerruti, New Initiativefrom the Second Circuit In the Nulliflcation Wars,
N.Y.L.J., Sept. 10, 1997, at 1.
83. Record at 328. ("The facts can be undisputed ... and the jury may choose not
to convict [a defendant,] as they did in Colonial days when they refused to convict
American smugglers, which is why the British were trying to remove the cases to Britain
for trial.")
84. Id. at 171 n.4. Judge Sprizzo has given an instruction on nullification to ajury:
[The defense] asked me for a charge on nullification. I gave them a charge
on nullification. I told the jury that they have the power to nullify, but they
didn't have the right to do it; and if they nullified, they would be doing
exactly the kind of thing that the defendant was accused of. That is the
charge I gave to the jury. The jury convicted him.
Record at 337.
85. See Lynch, 952 F. Supp. at 171-72; but see text accompanying note 71.
86. It would be naive, however, to suggest that judicial "nullification" does not
exist. To coin a term, "stealth nullification," occurs when ajudge fails to uphold the law
but does not affirmatively suggest the authority to do so. This happens every day!
Much can be said for Judge Sprizzo stating in writing what many judges do silently so
the merits of his actions can be debated.
But was it nullification? Judge Sprizzo never suggested what it was. See Lynch, 952
F. Supp. at 171-72. And at least one commentator asserted the same:
We do not have to agree with Judge Sprizzo in order to recognize that he
was exercising his best judgment to vindicate, not to nulli,, the extraordinary power of the criminal law. In similar circumstances, layjurors will face
even fewer hurdles to their chosen verdict than did Judge Sprizzo. Unlike
the judge, jurors do not even attempt to reduce their deliberative process
to writing - and are never forced to consider, much less acknowledge, the
extent to which they are "blinking" at the law. Even Judge Sprizzo, who
clearly invoked both the law and legacy of nullification, never used that
term to characterize his verdict.
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again, relied on negative implications: "[T] he Court has been cited no
authority by the parties that the Court, when it sits as a fact-finder,
does
87
not have that same prerogative of leniency [as juries.]
There is, however, one example of judicial action discussed by
Judge Sprizzo during the proceedings. It is revealing, and it shows
quite clearly thatJudge Sprizzo viewed the role of ajudge as fact-finder
analogous to the role of a jury as fact-finder.
THE COURT: [A] case could be clear, [the defendant]
can say I did it, and tell the jury, don't convict me....
What I am saying to you is that is what jury trials are all
about... that is what happens.
There is a classic case with Judge Sylvester Ryan when he
was here as a District Court judge. A college boy on his
Christmas vacation took a letter from the post office. He
was 18 years old. And Chief Judge Ryan said to defense
counsel, "When can you try this Case?" Defense counsel
said, "I am not ready at the moment." Judge Ryan said,
"How about this afternoon? Waive a jury. We will try it
this afternoon."
Judge Ryan tried the case and returned a verdict of "not
guilty" in the face of overwhelming evidence. He then
told the defendant, don't do it again.
Cerruti, supra note 82 (emphasis added). Apparently Judge Sprizzo, at least with re-

spect to juries (and most likely with respect to judges), would agree that nullification
may be a proper exercise of authority, under some circumstances.
MR. SIEGEL: If they conceded violating the law, what factual issue will we

try?
THE COURT: It doesn't make any difference. Thejury can nullify. That is
what juries are about, or don't you know that[?]
MR. SIEGEL: They will take the stand and concede violating the order[?]
THE COURT: Yes, and they are going to argue to the jury that you
shouldn't convict them for this because they are doing God's work. What
do you thinkjuries are all about? How do you think we have a Constitution
and Declaration of Independence?
Record at 336-37.
There is a distinction between ajury, or even a judge, saying, "this law was not meant
to reach this type of conduct-therefore, I refuse to convict," (or refusing to convict on
natural law grounds) and saying, "I know the defendants are guilty. But, by golly, I
don't care-I'm not going to convict." One could be termed a prerogative of leniency,
while the other could be termed nullification. Whether that distinction matters is beyond the scope of this comment. The panel majority chose not to address it. Judge
Jacobs, who wrote the majority opinion dismissing the Lynch appeal, would write: "It is
altogether unclear whether this prerogative amounts to nullification ...or is something
else." Lynch, 162 F.3d at 736 n.3. The author agrees.
87. Lynch, 952 F. Supp. at 171.
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That is what juries are about. Juries can do that. Grand
juries don't have to indict. It is basic law. I am surprised
you don't understand that. 88
Judge Sprizzo's understanding was that because contempt is a
crime against the court, "the policies which underlie [the] prerogative
[are] even stronger." 9 The policies were stronger, he reasoned, "because the Court, which has issued the Order, must and should have the
broadest possible discretion to determine whether the conduct ... is
such that a finding of criminal contempt is necessary to vindicate its
authority."90
After the decision was released, Professor Akhil Reed Amar expressed agreement with Judge Sprizzo's assertion, bluntly stating, "It's
a crime against the judge. If he wants to forgive and forget, he has the
power to do so."'9 1 At least one court thus far has cited the case to
92
demonstrate the power of a judge to nullify.
It is unclear whether the prerogative theory lends itself to an unjustifiable power-grab or, as Judge Sprizzo suggested, the broadest possible discretion under the law. It must be, though, that the validity of
the exercise is context based. For example, few of us would condemn
ajudge who invoked the prerogative to thwart a fugitive slave law. Indeed, depending on the context, political asylum laws can be viewed as
express nullification of the laws of the applicant's native jurisdiction.
That aside, there is some appeal in the notion that contempt, being an offence against the court, must yield to a trialjudge's discretion.
This appeal does loose some of its luster, however, when the contempt
charge is brought to enforce compliance with a duly enacted statute
93
rather than to enforce a procedural rule.
Under the common law, judicial discretion abounded and punishment in contempt proceedings ranged from the mundane to the magnificent: "[i]f the [contemnor] confesses [to] the contempt, the court
will proceed to correct him by fine, or imprisonment, or both, and
sometimes by a corporal or infamous punishment." 94 Despite the
88. Record at 337-38.
89. Lynch, 952 F. Supp. at 171-72.
90. Id.
91. Hoffman, supra note 48.
92. See People v. Douglas, 680 N.Y.S.2d 145, 147 (1998) ("[T]rial judges, like juries, have [the] power to engage in nullification.").
93. The government would make this argument, asserting that "the primary interest served by enforcement of the injunction [was] not vindication ofjudicial authority,
but protection of statutory rights." Brief for the United States of America at 41, United
States v. Lynch, 162 F.3d 732 (2d Cir. 1999).
94. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 284.
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great power that the common law afforded trial judges, their broad
discretion to punish has been necessarily and justifiably reigned in.
However, no such limit on ajudge's ability to use his discretion to determine how best to vindicate the authority of the court has been
recognized.
Lynch's and Moscinski's alleged offence was, in fact, a refusal to
obey the injunction-an order of the court. Although it can not fairly
be claimed that their alleged violation was entirely procedural, it cannot be ignored that the injunction was a process, a tool used to prod
Lynch and Moscinski into compliance with the positive law. In that
light, Judge Sprizzo's discretion was arguably at its purest.
The Government, on the other hand, did not viewJudge Sprizzo's
actions as pure, but as a perversion of his discretion. The Government
reasoned thatJudge Sprizzo exercised the full extent of his discretion
when he "explicitly urg[ed] the Government to bring a criminal contempt action." 95
Any democracy thrives on competing interests receiving a fair
hearing before they are dismissed. 9 6 Ours is no different. Congress, in
the wake of violence aimed at abortion providers, expressed an interest
in preventing, inter alia, acts of "obstruction" during abortion protests. 97 Apparently, United States Attorney Mary Jo White believed
Judge Sprizzo did not provide a fair hearing to the Government's
cause. Judging from the number of amici, many persons and organizations both within and without the Government agreed with her.98
United States Attorney White, who "personally reviewed the opinion," vowed to "appeal [the decision] if the law permit[ed]."99 An appeal ensued, the Government claiming, inter alia, Judge Sprizzo
displayed a "bias in favor of [the] defendants" 0 0 by refusing to convict
in the face of "obvious guilt ... under the facts and the law[.] "l0
95.

Brief for the United States of America at 39, United States v. Lynch, 162 F.3d

732 (2d Cir. 1999).
96. For an excellent note linking anti-abortion violence to the removal of legislative means of dissent via Roe, its progeny, restrictive statutory enactments, and more
recent restrictions on non-violent civil disobedience, see Note, Safety Valve Closed: The
Removal of Nonviolent Outletsfor Dissent and the Onset ofAnti-abortion Violence, 113 HARV. L.
REv. 1210 (2000).
97. H.R. Rep. No. 103-306, at 11 (1994), reprintedin 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 708.
98. See United States v. Lynch, 162 F.3d 732, 732-33 (2d Cir. 1998).
99. Hoffman, supra note 48.
100. Brief for the United States of America at 47, United States v. Lynch, 162 F.3d
732 (2d Cir. 1998).
101. Id.
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THE APPEAL

ControllingPrecedent: Wilson, Jenkins and Fayer

In United States v. Wilson, the Supreme Court established that the
Government may take an appeal "when a judge rules in favor of the
defendant after a verdict of guilty has been entered by the trier of
fact[.]"' 0 2 The Wilson Court, hearing an appeal from a jury verdict,
proffered a persuasive policy argument: namely, "Correction of [a
post-verdict] error of law would not grant the prosecutor a new trial or
subject the defendant to the harassment traditionally associated with
multiple prosecutions." 103 The Court further stated:
Where there is no threat of either multiple punishment
or successive prosecutions, the Double Jeopardy Clause is
not offended ....
[P]rotection against Government appeals attaches only where there is a danger of subjecting
the defendant to a second trial for the same offense[] 104
When an appellate court is confronted with a situation analogous
to Wilson, the analysis will be "a relatively straightforward task."10 5 An
appeal from a bench trial, however, requires a more nuanced review.
After a bench trial, the line of demarcation between trier of fact and
trier of law may be indeterminable. Consequently, an appellate tribunal must take care not to try the defendant "again upon the merits. 10 6
In United States v. Jenkins, the Court was confronted with an appeal
from a dismissal after a bench trial. 10 7 In light of the newly amended
Criminal Appeals Act, the question of whether an appeal could lie, said
the Court, "was unilluminated by . . . prior decisions[.]" 0 8s "Unilluminated" may be an overstatement since "the principles given expression through [the Double Jeopardy] Clause [also] apply to cases
tried to ajudge."' 0 9 In fact, the Jenkins Court viewed Wilson as directly
applicable to bench trials, stating: "We hold today in Wilson... that the
Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar an appeal when errors of law
may be corrected and the result of such correction will simply be a
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 352 (1975).
Id.
Id. at 344; id. at 336 (emphasis added).
Id. at 353.
Id. at 347 (quoting Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 133 (1904)).
United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 359 (1975).
Id. at 366.
Id. at 365.
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reinstatement of a jury's verdict of guilty or a judge's finding of
1 10
guilt."
But what if the district court never finds guilt? "The Double Jeopardy Clause forb[ids] an appeal where, after a bench trial and without
a general finding of guilt, the trial court ...dismisse[s] [an] indictment and discharge[s] the defendant."1 '' According to the Jenkins
Court, though, an appeal may still lie if the district court's acquittal was
based solely on legal error and the court "resolved [the relevant] issues
of fact in favor of the [Government.] "112 This rule, at least in theory, is
in accord with Wilson's rationale and with the spirit of double jeopardy
protections.
Considering the interests at stake, the appellate court's review
must be exacting. If "the basis for the District Court's action [i.e., factual rather than legal,]" is not "certain[,]" the rule in Wilson "does not
govern""13 and an appeal cannot lie. The Court's rationale for extending the rule to cases lacking a general finding of guilt and its proffered analysis for these cases is worth quoting in full:
A general finding of guilt by a trial judge may be analogized to a verdict of "guilty" returned by a jury. In a case
tried to ajury, the distinction between the jury's verdict of
guilty and the court's ruling on questions of law is easily
perceived. [But,] in a bench trial, both functions are
combined in the judge, and a general finding of "not
guilty" may rest either on the determination of facts in
favor of a defendant or on the resolution of a legal question favorably to him. If the court prepares special findings of fact, either because the Government or the
defendant requested them or because the judge has
elected to make them sua sponte, it may be possible upon
sifting those findings to determine that the court's finding of 'not guilty' is attributable to an erroneous conception of the law whereas the court has resolved against the
defendant all of the factual issues necessary to support a
114
finding of guilt under the correct legal standard.

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 368.

M at 359.
It at 367.

Id.
Id. at 366-67.
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"This is the dictum . . .the Government relie[d] on in pursuing
[the Lynch] appeal." 1 5 It was expressly adopted by the Second Circuit
in United States v. Fayer,116 shortly after Jenkins was decided.
In Fayer,the district court, after a bench trial, acquitted the defendant of "endeavoring to influence a witness in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1503."117 The Government took an appeal and claimed that while
"the trial judge misconstrued the statute," 118 the "court's special findings permit[ed] [a] reversal under [The Criminal Appeals Act] as construed in [Jenkins]."119
The panel found error in the district court's rationale, claiming:
"We consider that [the district judge] very probably misconstrued the
statute. '120 But, because the panel found the 'judge's findings .. .
ambiguous," 12 1 they were "forced to conclude that findings . ..as required by Jenkins [were] not at all 'clear." 1 2 2 The Court, therefore,
123
dismissed the appeal.
B.

Panel and En Banc Opinions

124
Judge Jacobs' Majority Opinion

Despite the magnitude of the Lynch appeal, Judge Dennis Jacobs'
majority opinion was short and to the point. After a brief statement of
facts, he began his analysis: "There is no absolute double jeopardy bar
1 25
to appellate review of a district court's judgment of acquittal[.]"
1 26
PARA>Convinced that Jenkins
did not apply, Judge Jacobs did not
discuss it. Instead, he cited to Wilson1 27 and to United States v. Scott1 2 8 in
support of the basic proposition that "[t] he availability of appellate review . . . depends on the essential character of the district court's
judg[e]ment."' 29 The panel majority was convinced that because the
essential character ofJudge Sprizzo's decision was "factual rather than
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

United States v. Lynch, 162 F.3d 732, 741 (Sack, J., concurring).
523 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1975).
Id. at 662.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 664.
Id.
United States v. Lynch, 162 F.3d 732, 732-36 (2d Cir. 1998).
Id. at 734.
See id. at 733-37.
420 U.S. 332 (1975).
437 U.S. 82 (1978).
Lynch, 162 F.3d at 734 (emphasis added).
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legal[,]... the Double Jeopardy Clause bar[red] the appeal." 130 With
that, Judge Jacobs addressed each of the Government's arguments in
turn.
First, the Government claimed an "appeal [was] not barred because... the district court found facts sufficient to establish each of
the four elements of criminal contempt . . . beyond a reasonable
doubt."13 ' This argument was based on the stipulated facts specially
found by the district court.' 3 2 Included in the stipulation were admissions by Lynch and Moscinski that they "knew of the [Court's] Order,"133 "were informed ... they were in violation of the law,"' 3 4 and
"acknowledged the warning [but] refused to leave [the driveway]."135
The reasonable, or even necessary, inference from these findings, the
Government suggested, was that Lynch and Moscinski acted deliberately and, therefore, willfully. As Judge Sprizzo resolved the case in
favor of Lynch and Moscinski because he found no willfulness, the
Government opined that the panel could order a judgment of conviction based on the Jenkins dicta.
At oral argument the court asked defense counsel Notre Dame
Law School Professor G. Robert Blakey whether Judge Sprizzo found
that Lynch and Moscinski acted "deliberately."' 3 6 Professor Blakey
suggested, and the court would agree, that whether or not Lynch and
Moscinski acted deliberately was a "different issue" from whether the
130.

Id. at 735.

131. Id. at 734.
132. United States v. Lynch, 952 F. Supp 167, 168 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). ("Because the
parties agree to the facts as set forth in their stipulation, the Court deems those facts
established and incorporates them into its findings.").
THE COURT: But did you ever get from Judge Sprizzo a finding that this
conduct was willful?
MR. SIEGEL: We believe we did, your honor.
THE COURT: ... It's just partially stipulated.
MR SIEGEL: Well, Judge Sprizzo adopted the stipulation as factual
findings.
THE COURT:... [but] when the court came down to it... the court said
that the [essential element] willfulness: it wasn't there.
MR. SIEGEL: That legal error... isn't... controlling on this court. ...
This court can correct the district court's legal error.
Audio tape: Oral argument in United States v. Lynch, 162 F.3d 732 (2d Cir. 1998)
(Sept. 10, 1998) (on file with author).
133. Lynch, 162 F.3d at 742 n.1 (Feinberg, J., dissenting).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Audio tape: Oral argument in United States v. Lynch, 162 F.3d 732 (2d Cir.
1998) (Sept. 10, 1998) (on file with author).
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court found willfulness.' 3 7 Any finding of deliberate action by Lynch
and Moscinski, according to Professor Blakey, was merely "evidence
from which [Judge Sprizzo] could make the ultimate decision [on
willfulness] "138
Professor Blakey insisted that while on the one hand "there [was]
evidence in th [e] record, which [could lead to a finding] of willfulness,
on the other hand, from that evidence [the court] must draw a legal
conclusion-which is mixed facts and law-that [Lynch's and Moscinski's conduct] constitute [d] willfulness."1 39 Professor Blakey "d[idn't]
care" 140 if Judge Sprizzo defined willfulness erroneously or not. He
reasoned that once the Judge decided to find the willfulness element
of contempt in favor of the defendants, the case "was done"'14 and "no
other court-not the [Second Circuit;] not the Supreme Court; not
another district judge on remand-[could] re-find the facts IJudge
14 2
Sprizzo] found."
The court agreed that Judge Sprizzo's ultimate resolution of the
issue was controlling and pointed to the plain language of Judge
Sprizzo's ruling: "the Court finds as a matter of fact that Lynch's and
Moscinski's... conscious-driven religious belief, precludes a finding of
willfulness."'143 To the majority, as a practical and legal matter, "the
business end of the district court's ruling was that the Government
failed to establish facts sufficient to prove the element of
144
willfulness."'
Second, the Government argued that because "the judgment of
acquittal was based solely on legal error-the district court's view that
137.

THE COURT: Now are you saying that he did not find anywhere that

they acted deliberately?

PROFESSOR BLAKEY: That's a different issue [than willfulness], your
honor.
THE COURT: I know that-[laughter]-that's why I'm asking.
Id.
138. Id. (emphasis added).
139.
Id.
140.
Id.
141.
Id.
142.
Id.
143.
United States v. Lynch, 162 F.3d 732, 734-35 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing United
States v. Lynch, 952 F. Supp 167, 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)).
144. Id. at 735. Later, Lynch and Moscinski would argue: "[T]he business end of the
Government's [petition for rehearing] must be a dismissal and a denial by this Court."
Defendant's Answer to Petition for Rehearing en banc and Motion to Dismiss at 9
(leave to file denied).
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the Government was required to prove.., an additional element [of
contempt] (bad intent or malice)- an appeal [was] not barred." 145
Despite the Government's argument, the United States' Attorney's
Office was not even sure how to characterize the ruling and, at different times, characterized it in different ways. As the defendants would
later argue in their papers:
The Government argued in its petition [for rehearing
and rehearing en banc] that "the District Court erred in
requiring the Government to prove one fact' which is not
actually an element of the offense." But the Government
argued in its brief that the district court "erred in addinga
motive element to the crime .... -146
Judge Jacobs did not accept the Government's characterization of
Judge Sprizzo's findings. Rather, he took the view that "the district
court defined the element of willfulness as requiring bad intent," 4 7
but did not "require proof of bad intent as a separate, fifth element of
148
the offence."
IfJudge Sprizzo based his acquittal on a separate, nonextant fifth
element, the case may have been resolved differently. In that case, the
district court would have resolved all the necessary elements of contempt against Lynch and Moscinski. Sifting is only appropriate where
the court "resolve[s] against the defendant[s] all of the factual issues
necessary to support a finding of guilt."149 Sifting is not appropriate
when the court could have, or even should have, found guilt.
Whatever the overall merits of the Government's case, the standard of review offered by the government at oral argument can only be
described as repugnant to both Jenkins and the Double Jeopardy
Clause. The Government suggested that "Jenkins ... contemplate [s]
that [the Circuit Court] can correct the [district] court's legal error if
...the district court.., made factual findings that support [a] conviction under the proper legal standard." 15 0 If that standard of review
was law, the prosecution would merely have to make out a prima facie
145. Lynch, 162 F.3d at 734.
146. Defendant's Answer to Petition for Rehearing en banc and Motion to Dismiss
at 6 n.3, United States v. Lynch 162 F.3d 732 (2d Cir. 1999) (No. 97-1092) (leave to file
denied) (emphasis added; internal citation omitted).
147. Lynch, 162 F.3d at 735.
148. Id. Judge Feinberg, dissenting, characterized the panel majority's logic as "semantics ... elevat[ing] form over substance." Id. at 745.
149. United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 367 (1975).
150. Audio tape: Oral argument in United States v. Lynch, 162 F.3d 732 (2d Cir.
1998) (Sept. 10, 1998) (on file with author).
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case in the district court to take an appeal. That is not what Jenkins
contemplates.
Judge Jacobs admitted that whatever Judge Sprizzo did do, "[it]
was error," 15 1 and agreed with the Government's position that "willfulness merely requires a specific intent to consciously disregard an order
of the court."152 In the context of religious motivation, the issue was
specifically answered by the Second Circuit between the time ofJudge
Sprizzo's decision and the Lynch appeal: "Even godly motivation does
not cancel th[e] intent.' 5 3 But, the panel majority saw "the district
court's error of law [as] influenc[ing] its finding as to willfulness and
[was] integral to that element; it [could not] be deemed ... to be an
additional, distinct and severable element," 15 4 which might have lent
itself to an appeal under Jenkins.
The Government's third and fourth arguments were related.
Based on their earlier characterizations ofJudge Sprizzo's error as legal rather than factual, they asserted that "the Double Jeopardy Clause
[did] not bar appellate review" 155 and, therefore, that the court had
the "power to direct a judgment of conviction based on the district
court's [findings.] '156 Judge Jacobs again responded that the district
court's judgment was essentially "factual" and, therefore, could not be
reviewed. 157 He added:
We lack jurisdiction over the prosecution's appeal if "the
ruling of the judge, whatever its label, actually represents
a resolution [in the defendant's favor], correct or not, of
some or all of the factual elements of the offense
charged." 158 Here the factual element is willfulness, and
the district court explicitly resolved it in favor of Lynch
and Moscinski; it does not matter that this factual finding
was arrived at under the influence of an erroneous view of
1 59
the law.
151.
Lynch, 162 F.3d at 735.
152.
Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted).
153.
Id. (citing United States v. Weslin, 156 F.3d 292, 298 (2d Cir. 1998)). Judge
Calabresi, who penned the Weslin opinion would ultimately vote to deny the Government's petition to rehear the case en banc. See United States v. Lynch, 181 F.3d 732,
732 (2d Cir. 1999) (en banc).
154. Lynch, 162 F.3d at 735.
155.
Id. at 734.
156.
Id.
157.
Id. at 735.
Id. (citing United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978)).
158.
159.
Id.
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With that, Judge Jacobs refused to reach the question of whether an
appellate court may order a trial court to enter ajudgment of conviction. His pragmatism surfaced and, just as Judge Sprizzo below, he
relied on negative implications: "Perhaps it can be done, but no one
has done it."160 With the Government's arguments on appellate review
dismantled, Judge Jacobs summarily refused to address Judge Sprizzo's
assertion of a "prerogative of leniency."' 61 He did note, however, that
it was "altogether unclear whether th[e] prerogative amounts to nullification ... or is something else."1 62 Judge Sprizzo's opinion, Judge
63
Jacobs asserted, "exhibit[ed] perfect candor[.]"'
Once one bifurcates his or her opinion of whatJudge Sprizzo did
do, from what one believes Judge Sprizzo ought to have done, one can
readily agree with Judge Jacobs' observation that Judge Sprizzo "exhibit[ed] perfect candor." Because Judge Sprizzo spelled out exactly
what he was doing, the court was able to find that his opinion was
based on a factual determination and that he would have exercised
leniency (or nullified) if he found that a finding of willfulness was not
warranted-exactly the truth, and exactly what he intended the appellate court to find.
One may dismiss Judge Sprizzo's findings on willfulness as erroneous (and they may be) if one wishes; and one may dismiss Judge
Sprizzo's claim of a prerogative of leniency as egregious if one wishes
(and it may be). But, one cannot ignore that fact thatJudge Sprizzo,
crafty as he was, could have foregone suggesting leniency as an alternative basis of acquittal. He must have known that he would be accused
of nullification. Agree with him or not, Judge Sprizzo did express perfect candor, if not perfectjudgment. JudgeJacobs recognized this and
recognized its Constitutional consequences.
Judge Sack's Concurring Opinion'6
1 65
Judge Sack, concurring, expressly "accepted the reason [ing]"
of the majority opinion, but "wrote separately... because of the importance of the issues.' 66 Unlike Judge Jacobs, however, Judge Sack dis-

160. Id. at 736.
161. Id. at 736 n.3.
162. Id. The Government would later charge: "[Judge Jacobs] seemingly tolerated
the lawless nature of the District Court's action." Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc at 6.
163. Lynch, 162 F.3d at 736 n.3.
164. Id. at 736-40.
165. Id. at 736.
166. Id.
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cussed Jenkins1 67 at length, focusing on the history1 6 8 of double
jeopardy protections in both the common law and Supreme Court precedent and explaining the policy reasons1 69 supporting the dismissal
of the appeal.
The Double Jeopardy Clause, Judge Sack explained, stands
"[e]nsconced between the accused felon's right of prosecution by
grandjury indictment and the freedom from compelled self-incrimination[.1 17 0 The Clause represents a "basic safeguard of the individual
against the might of the state" 17 1 for reasons enshrined in the oft1 72
quoted dicta of Green v. United States:
The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at
least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that
the State with all its resources and power should not be
allowed of make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to
17 3
live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity.
Judge Sack traced double jeopardy principles to Athens fourth
century, BC, 1 7 4 and its initial presence in the common law in the
twelfth century AD. 1 7 5 He cited to Lord Coke, who, in his Institutes of
the Laws of England,176 outlined "four related safeguards [of double
jeopardy principles]" 177 of which one was "a prohibition on one or
more prosecutions for the same offence following an acquittal[;] '1 78 to
167.
168.

United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358 (1975).
See Lynch, 162 F.3d at 736-38.

169.

See generally id. at 736-40.

170.
171.
172.

Id. at 737.
Id.
355 U.S. 184 (1957).

173.
Lynch, 162 F.3d at 737 (quoting Jenkins, 420 U.S. at 370 (internal citation
omitted).
174. Id. For an in-depth historical analysis, see Judge Friendly's opinion in United
States v. Jenkins, 490 F.2d 868 (2d Cir. 1973).
175.
Lynch, 162 F.3d at 737.
176. Id. ("Coke's Institutes were read in the American Colonies by virtually every
student of the law[.1" (quoting Gannet Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 424 (1979)
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal citation omitted))).
177.
Id.
178. Id. The common law plea was "autrefois acquit." See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 2,
at 27-28.
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the Magna Carta[;] 179 and to Blackstone, i80 who wrote of "th[e] universal maxim of the common law of England[:] that no man is to
brought 18into jeopardy of his life more than once, for the same
offence." 1
After reciting the history behind the Clause, Judge Sack discussed
the role ofJenkins'8 2 and Wilson 8 s in the appeal. The two cases, he

179. See Lynch, 162 F.3d at 738 ("[The] Magna Carta itself, provided that one acquittal or conviction should satisfy the law[.]" (quoting Ex Parte Lange, 85 U.S. 163
(1874)).
180. "[Njo citation is needed to establish the impact of... Blackstone on colonial
legal thought." Lynch, 162 F.3d 732, 737 (quoting Gannet Co., 443 U.S. at 424 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal citation omitted)). In
Federalist 84, Hamilton refers to "the judicious Blackstone." The Federalist No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
Defendants also cited Blackstone's natural law theories to justify their acquittal.
See e.g., Brief for Appellees at 34, Lynch, 162 F.3d 737. Blackstone spoke of "eternal,
immutable laws of good and evil, to which the creator himself in all his dispensations
conforms; and which he has enabled human reason to discover, so far as they are necessary for the conduct of human actions." 1 WiLLAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES at 40.
The laws are "binding over all the globe, in all countries, and at all times: no human
laws are of any validity, if contrary to [the natural law.I" Id. He also viewed the divine
law as trumping both the positive law and the natural law. "[U]ndoubtedly the revealed
law is (humanly speaking) of infinitely more authority than what we generally call the
natural law. Because one is the law of nature, expressly declared so to be by God himself; the other is only what, by the assistance of human reason, we imagine to be that
law." Id. at 42.
But see, Stanley N. Katz, Introduction to 1 WitLIAm BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES,
available in, WILuAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAws OF ENGLAND: A FACSIMILE OF THE FIRST EDITION iii (Univ. of Chicago Press 1979) (1765), who asserts that

Blackstone held "[a] positivist view." Stanley Katz unfairly and perhaps prejudicially
(he calls Blackstone's natural law essay "unconvincing" and describes Blackstone as "undoubtedly a dull man"), dismisses Blackstone's natural law essay as an obligatory eighteenth century exercise. Id. Indeed, it may have been obligatory to present this view in
his lectures. However, it hardly follows that it was an obligatory exercise to include such
a lecture in a legal treatise. Another view, the fairer view, is that Blackstone made the
choice to include the essay in his work because he believed it. See e.g., 1 WILUIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES at 40 (where Blackstone defends against accusations that the natural law is only "a multitude of abstracted rules and precepts, referring merely to the
fitness or unfitness of things[.]")
181. Lynch, 162 F.3d at 737 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 329).
According to Blackstone, the practical consequences of this "universal maxim" are that:
when a man is once fairly found not guilty upon any indictment, or other
prosecution, he may plead such acquittal in bar of any subsequent accusation for the same crime. Therefore an acquittal on an appeal is a good bar
to an indictment of the same offence. And so also was an acquittal on an
indictment a good bar to an appeal, by the Common Law.
4 Wmrtfi BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 329.

182.

420 U.S. 358 (1975).
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said, hinged on one essential procedural reality:18 4Jenkins would have
to undergo a second trial-another jeopardy-because there had
never been a general finding of guilt, 185 while Wilson would not have
to endure another trial because he had already been found guilty by a
jury. 186 The previous finding of guilt (or the lack thereof) was dispositive. Judge Sack explained:
Just as, under Wilson, an appellate court may reverse a
trial judge in order to reinstate a jury's guilty verdict,
under Jenkins, we may overturn a trial court's judgment
for a criminal defendant in a bench trial if, but only if, we
are in effect reinstating a finding of guilt by the trial
judge where "the court has resolved against the defendant
all of the factual issues necessary to support a finding of
187
guilt under the correct legal standard."
Judge Sack then evaluated whether, under the standard articulated above, the court could engage in the sifting suggested in Jenkins.1 88 Like Judge Jacobs, he made short work of the Government's
theory, leaning on the plain language of the district court's opinion:
"Judge Sprizzo did not resolve against the defendants all of the factual
issues necessary to support a finding of guilt. Instead, he specifically
found that willfulness .. .had not been proved beyond a reasonable
1 89
doubt.... There is no conviction for us to reinstate."
With Lynch's and Moscinski's liberty upheld by the majority opinion, and their right to it explained in his concurrence, Judge Sack
183. 420 U.S. 332 (1975).
184. See also Recent Case, Fifth Amendment-Double Jeopardy Clause-Second Circuit
Refuses to Review District Court's Acquittal of Defendants Charged With Violating Permanent
Injunction-UnitedStates v. Lynch, 181 .3d 330 (2d Cir. 1999), 113 HAsv. L. REv. 1252,
1252 (2000) ("Our commitment to the rule of law can be understood as a prioritization
of procedural consistency over individual determinations ofjustice. According to this
understanding, the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment protects a procedural right rather than substantive justice.")
185. See Jenkins, 420 U.S. at 370 ("To subject Uenkins] to any further... proceedings at this point would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.").
186. See Wilson, 420 U.S. at 352 ("[T]he defendant [has a] legitimate interest in the
finality of a verdict of acquittal. [However, correction] of an error of law... after a post
verdict ruling of law by a trial judge ... would not grant the prosecutor a new trial or
subject the defendant to the harassment traditionally associated with multiple
prosecutions.").
187. United States v. Lynch, 162 F.3d 732, 739 (2d Cir. 1998) (quotingJenkins, 420
U.S. at 367).
188. 420 U.S. 358 (1975).
189. Lynch, 162 F.3d at 740 (internal citation omitted).
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closed with a pragmatic argument and a public policy appeal applicable to all double jeopardy cases:
Between July 1971, the year after the Criminal Appeals
Act was passed, and June 1997, the last year for with statistics are available, there were 42,565 criminal bench trials
in the federal district courts, 11,488 of them ending in an
acquittal.... Not a single one of those appears to have
been overturned on appeal.
That is as it should be. If and when there is a wrongful
acquittal, the remedy, if remedy there be, rarely if ever
lies on appeal. There is a price, but it is one carefully
exacted by the Fifth Amendment.19°
Judge Feinberg's Dissenting Opinion1 9 1
Judge Feinberg saw public policy as his ally and chided the majority for elevating "form over substance."1 9 2 Unlike Judges Jacobs and
Sack, he was ready and willing to "vacate the district court's judgment
and remand the case.., for entry of ajudgment of conviction." 193 His
opinion was comprehensive, discussing and applying the "Jenkins
test," 194 reaching the merits of the appeal, 195 and rejecting the district
196
court's prerogative of leniency.
After reciting the facts, Judge Feinberg began his double jeopardy
analysis by frankly conceding, as the Government did at oral argument, 197 that "[t]he Double Jeopardy Clause generally bars appellate
190. Id. (internal citation omitted).
191. See id. at 74047.
192. Id. at 745.
193. See id. at 741. This may have been costly to Judge Feinberg's cause. Defendants would later argue thatJudge Feinberg's actions amounted to a second jeopardy.
See Defendant's Answer to Petition for Rehearing en banc and Motion to Dismiss at 1
(leave to file denied) ("[T]he dissenting opinion called for 'entry of a judgment of
conviction,' [which] itself constitut[ed] a second jeopardy for appellees Lynch and
Moscinski."). Apparently this novel argument was persuasive. Judge Sack would later
write, had the Second Circuit heard the case en banc, "the Government [would be
seeking,] for a third time[,] ... to convict and punish ... Bishop Lynch and Brother

Moscinski[.]" United States v. Lynch, 181 F.3d 330, 332 (2d Cir. 1999) (en banc) (Sack,
J., concurring) (emphasis added)).
194. See Lynch, 162 F.3d at 745-46.
195. See id. at 746.
196. See id. at 747.
197. Audio tape: Oral argument in United States v. Lynch, 162 F.3d 732 (2d Cir.
1998) (Sept. 10, 1998) (on file with author).
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review of verdicts of acquittal. 1 9 8 He forcefully insisted, however, that
"the Clause does not bar further proceedings that can be accomplished without subjecting the defendant to subsequent factfinding by
a trier of fact." 199 With that, he concluded that the Jenkins test was
wholly applicable to the appeal. While Judges Sack and Jacobs honed
in on Judge Sprizzo's ultimate resolution of the willfulness element,
Judge Feinberg looked deeper: he focused on the "constituent evidence" underlying Judge Sprizzo's findings that were already present
20 0
in the record.
Dispositive to Judge Feinberg was that the appellate court would
be ordering a judgment of conviction upon the record created below.
20 1
To him there would be no danger of a prohibited "second trial,"
and, thus, his proposed cure would not run afoul of the Double Jeop20 2
ardy Clause.
The error in Judge Feinberg's test is not difficult to discern, however. If Judge Feinberg's standard were a correct restatement of the
law, any acquittal would be open to appellate review, so long as the
court relied on facts found in the trial court. Judge Feinberg's "otherwise laudable [task]," 203 conforms to Jenkins' rhetoric, but not its
substance.
As a matter of form and substance, Judge Sprizzo expressly resolved the element of willfulness in favor of Lynch and Moscinski. As
this presented an uncannily similar posture as Fayer,Judge Feinberg
looked to Fayer20 4 for support. The Fayer court articulated the Jenkins
test as "whether... the court, [in] its findings of fact and conclusions
of law, [clearly] expressly or even impliedly found against the defen'20 5
dant on all issues necessary to establish guilt[.]
198. Lynch, 162 F.3d at 742.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 736.
201.
Id. at 743 (internal quotation omitted). Defendants and the majority obviously disagreed, and viewed appellate review as the equivalent of a new trial and as a
"new jeopardy." Id. at 736; see also Defendant's Answer to Petition for Rehearing en
banc and Motion to Dismiss at 15 (leave to file denied) ("The dissent's unlawful reconstruction has already constituted a second jeopardy for appellees Lynch and
Moscinski.").
202. See id.
203. Id. at 736.
204. 523 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1975) (dismissing an appeal from a bench trial
acquittal).
205. Lynch, 162 F.3d at 746.
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Since Judge Sprizzo expressly found "beyond a reasonable doubt
that neither Lynch nor Moscinski acted with the willfulness which
criminal contempt requires," 20 6 Judge Feinberg adopted an approach
suggested by the Government during oral argument 207 and focused on
the "expressly or even impliedly" 20 8 language in Fayer, noting, "the
judge did impliedly, but undoubtedly [find willfulness] ."209
Clinging to the "expressly or even impliedly" language is off the
mark though. Neither the Fayercourt nor the Jenkins Court suggested
that a district judge's so-called "implicit findings" could trump express
findings-even if the implicit findings are "undoubtable. 210 In fact,
just the opposite is true. As Judge Feinberg noted, but failed to address, the Fayer court refused to find guilt on "implied" facts because
"of the judge's other findings and statements which explicitly contradict[ed] an implicit reading of the findings as to motive."21 1 In an impressive and necessary exercise in restraint, the Fayer court yielded to
mere "statements" of the district judge that contradicted an implicit
reading of the findings. 21 2 In short, the district judge's express statements "forced [the court] to conclude.., the double jeopardy clause
2 13
would apply."
Nevertheless, after a sifting of the facts, Judge Feinberg (leaning
on Fayer) viewed the implicit findings below as "unmistakably showing
that the judge found beyond a reasonable doubt all the facts necessary
to establish willfulness[]"214 His primary support for this conclusion
was the stipulation of facts, 21 5 which was expressly incorporated into
206. Id. at 742.
207. Audio tape: Oral argument in United States v. Lynch, 162 F.3d 732 (2d Cir.
1998) (Sept. 10, 1998) (on file with author).
208. Fayer, 523 F.2d at 661.
209. Lynch, 162 F.3d at 745.
210. Id.
211. Fayer,523 F.2d at 664.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Lynch, 162 F.3d at 744.
215. The stipulation:
IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED by and between the United
States of America, by Mary Jo White, United States Attorney, Nicole A.
LaBarbera, Assistant United States Attorney, George Lynch, the defendant,
Christopher Moscinski, the defendant, and their counsel, A. Lawrence
Washburn, Jr., Esq., that on February 23, 1996, Judge John E. Sprizzo entered an Order Imposing Permanent Injunction in United States v. Lynch,
952 F.Supp. 167, and that the Order provided as follows:
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Judge Sprizzo's findings. 216 In that stipulation, Lynch and Moscinski
admitted "[they] were seated in the Clinic's driveway; they were told by
police that they were in violation of the [injunction]; and they ac'2 17
knowledged the [officer's] warning and refused to leave.
With these admissions embossed in the record, Judge Feinberg
concisely reported the treasure trove his sifting revealed:
Unlike the findings at issue in Fayer, these are not at all
ambiguous. Lynch and Moscinski did not dispute the
Government's factual allegations. They raised no legally
cognizable defense. The judge heard no legally exculpatory testimony. His findings, establish beyond a reasonable doubt, that Lynch and Moscinski acted willfully when
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants George Lynch and Christopher
Moscinski, their agents, and all individuals acting in concert with defendants or their agents, are permanently enjoined from violating, or aiding
and abetting the violation of, the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act
of 1994, 18 U.S.C. ' 248, in any way, including but not being limited to:
1. impeding or obstructing automotive or any other form of ingress into, or
egress from, the Women's Medical Pavilion in Dobbs Ferry, New York; and
2. attempting to take-or inducting [sic], encouraging, directing, aiding,
or abetting in any manner others to take-any of the actions set forth in
subparagraph 1 of this order."
IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED AND AGREED that on August 24, 1996 at
approximately 7:30 a.m., officers of the Dobbs Ferry Police Department
were called to the Women's Medical Pavilion ("Clinic"), 88 Ashford Avenue, Dobbs Ferry, New York, where George Lynch and Christopher Moscinski, the defendants, were "seated in the driveway area" of the Clinic. A
police officer "observed several vehicles unsuccessfully attempt to enter the
parking lot." At approximately 7:50 a.m. a police officer informed the defendants that "they were in violation of the law and that if they did not leave
the area immediately they would be arrested." The defendants "acknowledged the warning and refused to leave." The officer then arrested the
defendants, both of whom went "limp" and had to be carried to a bus for
transport to the police station.
IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED AND AGREED that on August 24, 1996, at
the time George Lynch and Christopher Moscinski, the defendants, sat in
the Clinic's driveway, they knew of the Order Imposing Permanent Injunction in United States v. Lynch, 952 F.Supp. 167, and knew that the Order
enjoined them from "impeding or obstructing automotive or any other
form of ingress into, or egress from, the Women's Medical Pavilion in
Dobbs Ferry, New York".
Lynch, 162 F.3d at 742 n. 1 (Feinberg,J., dissenting).
216. Lynch, 952 F. Supp. 167, 168 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
217. Lynch, 162 F.3d at 744-45.
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they deliberately violated the specific terms of the court's
2 18
order, of which they were aware.
Sifting can properly be described as an inspection and objective
characterization of a district court's findings of fact. The Jenkins test
provides no opportunity to consider judicial motive, nor to use the
occasion to declare judicial fancy, nor to rule on "undoubtable" implicit findings. As the defendants correctly argued in later papers, sifting must reveal-not create-a finding of guilt.
The analogy to sifting is important. When one sifts, sediment
that does not belong is removed from the sieve. But nothing is changed. If the Court were to sift, then it would
need to sift out an erroneous finding and could only reverse an acquittal if what was left was a finding of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt by the trier of fact relative to
each element of the crime. In other words, the sifter
never has more than that with which he or she started.
The Government advocates and the dissent employs
something more akin to alchemy; they are not trying to
sift. Indeed they want to change a verdict of not guilty
2 19
[into] a verdict of guilty.
But because the verdict was "the result of gross legal error,"220 after sifting the facts Judge Feinberg would have "vacate[d] the judgment of acquittal and [remanded the case] to the district court for
22
entry of a judgment of conviction[.]" 1
This proposed change raised the ire of the panel majority. They
did not expressly dispute Judge Feinberg's characterization of the facts
found in the district court, nor did they reject the Jenkins dictum in
toto; it is clear, however, that they had no doubts about the inapplicability of Jenkins to the Lynch appeal:
One can imagine a case, however rare, in which ajudge's
not-guilty verdict could be overturned under the Jenkins
dictum.... If we were to examine the record below, including the stipulation on which the court's judgment was
based, together with the opinion of the court containing
its explanation for its findings of fact, as the dissent does,
218.

Id. at 745 (Feinberg, J., dissenting).

219. Defendant's Answer to Petition for Rehearing en banc and Motion to Dismiss
at 18 n.2 (leave to file denied) (emphasis in original).
220.

Lynch, 162 F.3d at 747 (Feinberg, J., dissenting).

221.

Id.
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we might come to a conclusion different from the district
court's, for reasons spelled out in the dissent. But that is
exactly what the Double Jeopardy Clause forbids us to
do.

22 2

After addressing the merits of the appeal, Judge Feinberg raised
and dismissed the possibility of a judge, or even a jury, properly exercising a prerogative of leniency, although Judge Sprizzo never expressly invoked the prerogative. 223 While one commentator has
charged that "by characterizing the determination of willfulness as a
nonreviewable issue of fact.. .Judge Sprizzo ... nulliffied] the injunction," 22 4 Judge Feinberg, on the other hand, addressed the prerogative
because in his view "the judge . . . relfied] on ajury's power to nullify
the law as an alternative basis for acquitting Lynch and Moscinski." 22 5
Judge Feinberg accurately observed that Judge Sprizzo relied on
negative implications to justify the exercise of the prerogative 226 and
sternly responded: "The authority against this claimed prerogative is
clear." 227 To buttress his position, he closely tracked the language of
Supreme Court precedent, noting, "The Supreme Court has characterized the practice of jury nullification as the 'assumption of a power'
which ajury has 'no right to exercise.' 228 Second Circuit precedentalbeit precedent decided after Judge Sprizzo's decision-indicated as
much: "In Thomas,229 we 'categorically' rejected 'the idea that, in a society committed to the rule of law,jury nullification is desirable or that
courts may permit it to occur when it is within their authority to prevent [it].' "230 Famed Second Circuit Judge Learned Hand, explained
Judge Feinberg, shared this view on nullification: "the power ofjuries
222. Id. at 740 & n.6.
223. United States v. Lynch, 952 F. Supp. 167, 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("[E]ven assuming arguendo that the Court were satisfied that the Government's proof established the
requisite willfulness, the Court would still find the defendants not guilty.") (emphasis
added).
224. Recent Case, Fifth Amendment-DoubleJeopardy Clause-Second Circuit Refuses to
Review District Court's Acquittal of Defendants Charged With Violating PermanentInjunctionUnited States v. Lynch, 181 F.3d 330 (2d Cir. 1999), 113 HARV. L. REv. 1252, 1257 (2000).
225. Lynch, 162 F.3d at 747 (emphasis added).
226. Id. ("The judge stated that he could find 'no authority ... that the Court,
when it sits as a fact-finder, does not have the same prerogative of leniency' as that of a
jury. 952 F. Supp. at 171.").
227. Id.
228. Id. (quoting Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393 (1932)).
229. 116 F.3d 606 (2d Cir. 1997).
230. Id. (As Judge Feinberg points out, this case was decided four months after
Judge Sprizzo's decision.).
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to ... exercise a power of lenity is just that-a power; it is by no means
23

a right." '
Judge Sprizzo, in his case for the prerogative, credited the term's
genesis with equally famed Second Circuit Judge Friendly. 2 32 Judge
Feinberg asserted, however, thatJudge Friendly's apparent approval of
the prerogative did not extend to its exercise by a district judge:
Judge Friendly noted, "the historic position of the jury affords ample ground for tolerating the jury's assumption
of the power to insure lenity," but he immediately went
on to say that the judge does not have that power, because "the judge is hardly the voice of the community"
23 3
even when he sits as a facffinder.
Finally, Judge Feinberg argued generally that the prerogative is an
"arbitrary... power ... that may create an appearance of injustice that
cannot be tolerated by a legal system that strives to resolve cases in a
reliable, consistent and objective manner," 234 and specifically that
"[b]y refusing to enforce a valid criminal statute, a judge acts as a
235
quasi-legislator and usurps that Article I function of Congress."
There is much to be said for Judge Feinberg's observations. Having little basis in the positive law, a district judge's nullification is necessarily arbitrary and it may create the appearance of injustice. But it
must not be overlooked that nullification, at least when engaged in by
juries, has a rich history in Anglo jurisprudence 23 6 and that to some,
Judge Sprizzo's decision was anything but the appearance of injustice;
2 37
it was a vindication of the natural law.
Furthermore, any concern over the appearance of injustice is
largely irrelevant considering the underling political issue in the Lynch
case, namely, abortion. While this argument may seem counterintuitive, when hotly contested political issues underpin a judicial resolution, any result will be viewed as unjust by a large number of citizens.
To see this observation in operation one need only refer to Justice
231. Id.
232. United States v. Barash, 365 F.2d 395, 403 (2d Cir. 1966). It is important to
note thatJudge Sprizzo looked to Judge Friendly only to label the so-called "nullification," he did not assert Judge Friendly would approve of his reading of the law. See
United States v. Lynch, 952 F. Supp. 167, 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
233. Lynch, 162 F.3d at 747 (quoting United States v. Maybury, 274 F.2d 899, 903
(2d Cir. 1960)).
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. See sources cited supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
237. See sources cited supra notes 35 & 180.
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O'Connor's debate with Justice Scalia in Casey23 8 over which result overruling Roe2 3 9 or reaffirming Roe's central holding -would better
240
serve the Supreme Court's interest in preserving its own legitimacy.
To restate the obvious: " [S]o long as [Roe] remains, the Court will be
perceived.., as political and will continue to be the target of demonstrations, marches, television advertisements, mass mailings, and the
like." 241 This is true of pro-lifers and pro-choicers alike. And at least
with respect to impugning political fancy to the bench, this is true of
the circuit courts and district courts as well; perhaps, justifiably so. To
''24 2
be sure, neither Roe nor Casey has created a "Pax Roeana.
More troublesome is the specter of a district court usurping Congress' Article I legislative role. This concern is especially kindled
where, as here, the court's injunction was premised on a duly enacted
statute-the FACE Act. But as Judge Sprizzo suggested, and to which
the Government apparently agreed, Lynch's and Moscinski's "conduct
243
[was] not the kind of conduct that Congress had primarily in mind."
For the defendants, Judge Sprizzo's decision represented "an application of Blackstone's Tenth Rule[:] that a statute should not be
interpreted to produce a ludicrous result." 244 For the Government,
the decision represented an unlawful "nullif[ication] . . .under the
245
label of exercising a prerogative of leniency[.]"
Perhaps the true nature of the decision rests somewhere between
the notions of Blackstone and judicial belligerence. It is clear from the
record that the Judge rejected (at least expressly) pleas to invoke the
natural law, 2 4 6 although it is also clear that the Judge expressed hostil247
ity towards the FACE Act.
Judge Sprizzo, going so far as to suggest that he had the power to
exercise leniency, most likely would have invoked it if he thought it was
necessary. In light of that, his decision is probably best understood, as
one commentator opined, as Judge Sprizzo "exercising his best judg238. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
239. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
240. See Casey v. Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. 833, 864-69 (O'Connor, J.), 9961001 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
241. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 116 (1990).
242. Casey, 505 U.S. at 996 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
243. Record at 196-97.
244. Brief for Appellees at 34, Lynch, 162 F.3d 732 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Model
Penal Code and Commentaries, Part I 404 (1985)).
245. Reply Brief for the United States of America at 21, Lynch, 162 F.3d 732 (2d Cir.
1998) (internal quotation omitted).
246. See supra text accompanying note 63.
247. See Brief for the United States of America at 46-49, Lynch, 162 F.3d 732 (2d Cir.
1998).

2000-2001]

THE DOUBLEJEOPARDY CATEGORY

ment to vindicate,
not to nullify, the extraordinary power of the crimi24 8
nal law."

Judge Sack's Concurring Opinion in the Denial of the Petition

249
for Rehearing En Banc

Judge Sack's concurring opinion was not a replay of his panel concurrence.2 5 0 Instead, he wrote to address what he saw as "two defining
characteristics of [the] prosecution[.]"

25 1

First, "the injunction... was not [the] garden variety court order.
[T] heir behavior was... directed to one of the most highly charged
political and moral issues of our time." 25 2 For this, Judge Sack called

the Government to task:
[T]he Government virtually never seeks to have [acquittals] overturned on appeal[.] [But, with] permission
from the highest reaches of the Justice Department...
the Government attempt[s] by this petition a third time
to have the defendants Lynch and Moscinski found guilty
and punished.., for an alleged crime the maximum sentence for which was a modest fine and six months in

25
jail. 3

He then addressed the proper standard for willfulness and Judge

Sprizzo's prerogative of leniency.2 54 Judge Sack agreed with Judges Ja-

cobs' and Feinberg's insistence that "willfulness [in a criminal contempt proceeding] requires nothing more than a specific intent to
consciously disregard an order of the court."255 "Bad intent,"256 he
observed, "is not required."2 57 He also agreed, apparently after givinig
248. Cerruti, supra note 82.
249. United States v. Lynch, 181 F.3d 330, 332 (en banc) (no majority opinion).
250. See id. at 330 ("My views with respect to this appeal are set forth in my opinion
concurring in the majority opinion of the panel[.]").
251. Id.
252. Id. at 330-31.
253. Id. at 331; but see id ("I cannot ascribe to the Government any particular motive
or motives; neither do I disparage them. And I imply no criticism of the prosecutors in
this case.").
254. Id. at 331-32.
255. Id. at 332 (quoting Lynch, 162 F.3d at 746 (Feinberg, J., dissenting) (internal
citation omitted)).
256. Id.
257. Id.

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

it some thought in the time after his panel concurrence, 258 with Judge
Feinberg that "[t]he exercise of nullification by a federal judge ...
cannot be reconciled with the Supreme Court's admonition that [for
an Article III judge] 'to perform its high function in the best way[,]
25 9
justice must satisfy the appearance ofjustice."
It seems two competing interests are thus raised. First, Judge Sack
suggested the district court committed a breach of his duty to, all other
things equal, satisfy the appearance ofjustice. Second, Judge Sack, by
refusing to correct that breach of duty, arguably adds to that breach of
duty. It must be, then, that Judge Sack viewed the Double Jeopardy
Clause as a more important procedural safeguard and Constitutional
doctrine than the appearance of injustice created by Judge Sprizzo's
apparent breach of duty.
Judge Sack obviously was concerned with tempering any appearance of injustice. He stated: "[I]t is arguable that because the district
court was called upon to preside over proceedings thick with political
and moral implications its fastidious adherence to the rule of law was
most clearly required and any departure therefrom that much more
strongly to be condemned. '260 But with that condemnation, Judge
Sack was cognizant, as he had been all along, of the broader Constitutional implications. He stated:
But it is not the district judge whom the Government
seeks for a third time now to convict and punish; it is
Bishop Lynch and Brother Moscinski. And it is not the
district judge or his decisions that are protected by the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment; it is
26 1
these defendants.
Clearly, for Judge Sack the defendant's interest in not being subjected to an additional jeopardy reigned paramount over any action to
cure what he viewed as error below. It is also important to realize that
262
Judge Sack did not base his decision on bland "form over substance"
as the en banc dissenters charged. On the contrary, to Judge Sack, the
258. Id. at 331 ("The government's efforts to seek en banc review are also out of the
ordinary. The Federal Rules of Appellate procedure provide 14 days for a party to seek
rehearing and rehearing En Banc. Fed. R. App. P. 40(a) (1). The government, with the
twice-granted permission of this Court, took some eleven weeks to do so.").
259. Id. (quoting Lynch, 162 F.3d at 747 (Feinberg, J., dissenting) (internal citation
omitted)).
260.
261.
262.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 337.
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law and policy underlying the DoubleJeopardy Clause grew stronger as
the case progressed:
When the awesome power of the United States is fully enlisted in the endeavor of seeking to overturn an acquittal
in a case boiling with political significance, it seems to me
that the DoubleJeopardy Clause attains its full stature as a
bulwark for the individual against the virtually unlimited
resources of the Government employed to achieve its
ends of the day. The case before us, then, is an archetypal
one for reliance on the DoubleJeopardy Clause, demanding the most punctilious regard for the Fifth Amendment
263
rights of these defendants.
One thing is clear, Judge Sack would eventually condemn all parties involved below: Lynch and Moscinski, 264 the Government, 2 65 and
the district court. 266 In the end, although Judge Sack was powerless to
cure what he saw as many legal defects in the opinion below, he closed:
Since I have concluded that the Government did not have
the ability under the Constitution to have a second
chance to convict Lynch and Moscinski, I believe all the
more that we are wise in not giving the Government a
third opportunity to try to convict them upon rehearing
26 7
en banc.

263. Id. at 332.
264. United States v. Lynch, 162 F.3d 732, 740 (2d Cir. 1998) ("If we were to examine the record below, including the stipulation on which the court's judgment was
based, together with the opinion of the court containing its explanation for its findings
of fact, as the dissent does, we might come to a conclusion different from the district
court's, for reasons spelled out in the dissent.").
265. See Lynch, 181 F.3d at 331 ("[All this] for an alleged crime the maximum sentence for which was a modest fine and six months in jail.").
266. See id. at 332 ("[I] t is arguable that because the district court was called upon
to preside over proceedings thick with political and moral implications its fastidious
adherence to the rule of law was most clearly required and any departure therefrom
that much more strongly to be condemned.").
267. Id.
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Judge Cabranes' Dissenting Opinion in the Denial of the
2 68
Petition for Rehearing En Banc
Judge Cabranes' dissent was comprehensive. He would have accepted the Government's petition for en banc review because the case
involved issues of "exceptional importance." 2 69 Namely,
(1) the permissibility of an appeal by the Government
from an acquittal following a trial without a jury....
(2) the legitimacy of the district court's unprecedented
proclamation that both juries and judges, when sitting as triers of fact, enjoy a "prerogative" to nullify
the law[, and]
(3) in answering the first question and declining to reach
the second, the panel majority .

.

. engaged in an

analysis that conflicts with governing cases, thereby
making an en banc rehearing necessary to maintain
270
uniformity of precedent.
After a brief restatement of Judge Sprizzo's decision, Judge

Cabranes addressed the first question. He accepted Jenkins27 1 as
adopted in Fayer2 7 2 as authority and asserted, like Judge Feinberg in his
2 73
panel dissent, that if the district court "expressly or even impliedly"
found guilt under the correct legal standard, then "there has been a
finding of guilt, in substance though not in form, which an appellate
268. See id. at 332-38. Judge Cabranes' opinion was joined, in full, by Judges Parker,
Pooler and Sotomayor, and was joined in part by judge Leval. See id. at 332. In a twist
of irony (or grace if you are Bishop Lynch or Brother Moscinski),
(judge Feinberg] was disabled by law from casting a ballot [for the en banc
petition] despite the fact that he would have been entitled to participate in
such a rehearing.... Judge Feinberg is a senior circuitjudge[.] Under the
governing statute, rehearing en banc must be "ordered by a majority of the
circuit judges of the circuit who are in regular active service," but "any
senior circuit judge of the circuit shall be eligible ... to participate, at his
election and upon designation and assignment .. , as a member of an en
banc court reviewing a decision of a panel of which such judge was a
member." 28 U.S.C. § 46(c).
Id. at 333-34 n.1.
269. Id. at 333.
270. Id.
271.
420 U.S. 358 (1975).
272. 523 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1975).
273. Lynch, 181 F.3d at 334 (quoting Fayer, 523 F.2d at 664 (quoting Jenkins, 420
U.S. at 367)).
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court can instruct the trial judge
to 'reinstate' upon remand without
2 74
any additional fact-finding."
Judge Cabranes' test, though not as encompassing as Judge Feinberg's, is overbroad nonetheless. Surely it is not an accurate restatement of the Jenkins test. A careful reading of the Jenkins opinion revels
that the Court used the "form or substance" language merely to characterize the verdict before them. Further, Jenkins reveals the Court's
animus towards allowing an appeal from an acquittal unless the appellate tribunal is certain the trial court "resolved against the defendant[s] all of the factual issues necessary to support a finding of guilt
under the correct legal standard." 2 75 Then Justice Rehnquist, for the
unanimous Jenkins Court wrote:
The [district] court's opinion certainly contains no general finding of guilt, and although the specific findings
resolved against the respondent many of the component
elements of the offense, there is no finding on the statutory element of "knowledge." In light of the judge's discussion . . . such an omission may have reflected his
conclusion that the Government had failed to establish
the requisite criminal intent beyond a reasonable doubt.
On such a record, a determination by the Court of Appeals favorable to the Government on the merits of the
[appeal] ... would not justify a reversal with instruction
to reinstate the general finding of guilt: there was no such
276
finding, in form or substance, to reinstate.
This passage makes clear that in order for an appeal to lie, the
district court must have made the requisite findings in form and in
substance against the defendants. Any uncertainty must be resolved in
favor of the defendants. This must be the construction considering
the absolute language of the Double Jeopardy Clause 2 77 and general
principles of criminal law and fairness. Any other construction would
have the perverse effect of burdening an acquitted defendant, who has
been released from jeopardy, 278 with defending the district judge's
opinion before appellate courts. In an extreme case, the defendant
would be strapped with the burden to defend a districtjudge's explicit
274. Id.
275. Jenkins, 420 U.S. at 368.
276.
277.
278.

Id. at 367-68 (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added).
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
See infra note 284.
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findings against "undoubtable" implicit findings proffered by the government or by appellate judges sua sponte.
But even assuming arguendo Judge Cabranes' articulation of the
proper test for review were correct, Judge Sprizzo's decision still could
not be appealed. The district court never made a finding of guilt, expressly or impliedly, and, therefore, there was no finding, in form or in
substance, for the en banc court to "reinstate." Judge Cabranes, obviously hesitant in his application, admits as much by quoting "reinstate"
2 79
as if its meaning were uncertain.
Armed with his reading of Fayer, Judge Cabranes dismissed the
28 0
panel majority opinion as a "misreading of Supreme Court cases,"
281
and gingerly applied
his analysis under what he termed the "further
proceedings test[.]" 282 His standard, it must be observed, is thrice removed from the United States Constitution and is premised on a
'continuing jeopardy' concept... articulated by... Justice Holmes
. . .but [which] has never been adopted by a majority of [the Supreme] Court. '28 3 Judge Cabranes' newly minted "further proceedings test" was loosely derived from Fayer,284 Fayer is a broad paraphrase
of the Jenkins dicta; and the Jenkins Court attempted to divine meaning
from the rhetorically peculiar Double Jeopardy Clause.
Judge Cabranes did concede that the Circuit Court could not "order the district court to enter ajudgment of conviction based on [its]
279. Lynch, 181 F.3d at 334.
280. Id. at 335.
281.
See id at 335 ("It is not necessary to take a definitive position as to whether the
required analysis would lead to a conclusion that appellate jurisdiction does in fact exist
in this case. [But, there is] potential for a strong argument to be made. . .
282. Id. at 335 n.7.
283. United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. at 369 (1975).
284. Judge Cabranes also garnered support from a "further proceedings" standard
allured to in a footnote in Smalisv. Pennsylvania,476 U.S. 140, 146 n.9 (1986). But the
further proceedings discussed by the court are not the equivalent of a second trial-that
would elevate form over substance. Indeed, further proceedings can occur in the appellate court. Moreover, a further proceeding need not be devoted to fact-finding to be
charged with the label "further proceeding." The text of the opinion makes this clear:
When a successful post-acquittal appeal by the prosecution would lead to
proceedings that violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, the appeal itself has
no proper purpose. Allowing such an appeal would frustrate the interest of
the accused in having an end to the proceedings against him. The Superior court was correct, therefore, in holding that the Double Jeopardy
Clause bars a post-acquittal appeal by the prosecution. . .when it might
translate into "further proceedings of some sort, devoted to the resolution
of factual issues going to the elements of the offences charged."
Id. at 145-46 (internal quotation omitted).
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own finding of willfulness," 285 but he insisted that "[the court is] not
necessarily required to ignore the near inevitability of... inferences
from [the district court's] subsidiary factual findings."28 6
The Double Jeopardy Clause does, however, require that the
Court ignore "inevitabl[e] . . . inferences from [the district court's]
subsidiary factual findings."28 7 It is the role of the trial court to determine the relevance of subsidiary factual findings. Since jeopardy attaches at the time of acquittal,2 8 8 once the trial judge resolves facts in
favor of the defendant, any subsequent resolution inconsistent with the
decision of the trial judge is a judgment in favor of the Government
"based on its own findings" 28 9 and an additional jeopardy offensive to
the Constitution.
Judge Cabranes, however, viewed en bane review as warranted because it "might have led to the conclusion that the district court found
willfulness, properly defined[.]"290 The "potential for such a conclusion," 291 wrote Cabranes, "coupled with the district court's apparent
maneuvering, would... have given the en banc court good reason to
pause and consider whether it would elevate form over substance... to
give dispositive effect to the district court's purported resolution of the
292
willfulness element in the defendants' favor."
285. Lynch, 181 F.3d at 336. JudgeJacobs addressed this notion in his panel majority opinion:
In undertaking to show the absence of any remaining fact issue for the
district court, the dissent has taken the district court's finding on willfulness, dismantled it, studied its constituent evidence, and put it back together again without the flaw of legal error. What defeats this othervise
laudable project is that the evidence thus reconstituted is the evidence that
bears upon one element of the case, as to which the district court has made
a finding that released these defendants from the jeopardy in which they
stood. Thus the dissent disregards the district court's troublesome determination that the defendants' conduct "as a matter of fact" was not wilfuland judged that it compels the opposite finding on that key element. The
dissent seemingly avoids subjecting the defendants to a newjeopardy by the
economical expedient of simply directing the district court to enter ajudgment of conviction; but the defendants who would be called upon to serve
their sentences would experience such a disposition as a factual reevaluation of guilt by the appellate court, and a new jeopardy.
United States v. Lynch, 162 F.3d 732, 736 (2d Cir. 1998).
286. Id. at 336.
287. Id.
288. See supra text accompanying notes 9 and 197.
289. Lynch, 181 F.3d at 336; see also supra note 284.
290. Lynch, 181 F.3d at 337.
291. Id
292. Id.
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ButJudge Cabranes would be subjecting Lynch and Moscinski to
an additional jeopardy in order to chastise the districtjudge. That is
not what our Constitution contemplates. If a districtjudge engages in
illicit maneuvering, it is not the defendant who ought to be punished,
it is the district judge. Our law affords one powerful remedy-impeachment. 2 93 Moreover, Judge Cabranes undercuts his own argument for granting the petition by raising and dismissing the availability
of a prerogative in his dissent.
Judge Cabranes addressed the district court's asserted "prerogative of leniency," because it was "a second important issue that could
be reached if appellate jurisdiction existed." 29 4 He viewed Judge Jacobs' dictum regarding the so-called prerogative "potentially dangerous," 295 since it could be used to suggest that "triers of fact may...
have a right to refuse to convict... despite having found facts that
require [a] conviction. '29 6 In his view, there was no "distinction ...
297
between 'nullification' and a 'prerogative of leniency."'
With that established, Judge Cabranes rejected the notion that a
district judge could ever exercise a prerogative of leniency and
harpooned the district court for ignoring "a century-old line of cases
holding thatjury nullification is a power and not a right."29 8 Nullification, he wrote, is a "lawless, denial of due process, ' 299 and "an exercise
of erroneously seized power." 30 0 To Judge Cabranes the sin of nullification is exponentially greater when a judge,
in whom the Constitution entrusts the power "to say what
the law is," Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,
177 (1803), proclaims for himself and purports to exercise a "prerogative" to nullify the law by acquitting guilty
defendants if and when he sees fit to do so, thereby engaging in the very same lawless usurpation of power that
he is bound to do his utmost to prevent. 30 1
293. U.S. CONST. Art. III, § 1.
294. Lynch, 181 F.3d at 337 (quoting United States v. Lynch, 952 F. Supp 167, 171
(S.D.N.Y. 1997)).
295. Id. (JudgeJacobs: "[I]t is altogether unclear whether this prerogative amounts
to nullification... or is something else." United States v. Lynch, 162 F.3d 732, 736 n.3
(2d Cir. 1998)).
296. Id.
297. Id. at 338. He added: " [M]uch less that any such distinction might be significant." Id.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301.
Id.
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It was there thatJudge Cabranes ended his dissent. It is clear that
the corpus of his opinion was to correct what he saw as the wayward
decision of a district judge. A laudable goal, but constitutionally impermissible. Judge Cabranes promulgated a new, unlawful standard of
review, itself a usurpation of Congress' Article I powers. In light of
that, Judge Sack's words are even more appropriate:
[I]t is not the district judge whom the [court] seeks for a
third time now to convict and punish; it is Bishop Lynch
and Brother Moscinski. And it is not the district judge or
his decisions that are protected by the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Fifth Amendment; it is these
defendants[.]302

V. CONCLUSION
United States v. Lynch is a Double Jeopardy case;30 3 it is also an
abortion protest case.3 0 4 While it is self-evident that abortion politics
influenced the Government's decision to appeal,3 0 5 one can only speculate if abortion politics influenced the Circuit Court dissenters' at30 6
tempt to erode protections afforded the accused for millennia.
302.

Id. at 332.

303. United States v. Lynch, 162 F.3d 732, 734 (2d Cir. 1998) ("The first question
presented arises under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment....").
304. Lynch, 181 F.3d at 330 (2d Cir. 1999) (en banc) (Sack, J., concurring)
("[Lynch and Moscinski] were prosecuted for participating in a demonstration that
obstructed women's access to a clinic where abortions are performed. While irrelevant
to the guilt or innocence of the defendants, we would be oblivious if we were not aware
that their behavior was thus directed to one of the most highly charged political and
moral issues of our time.").
305. In case it is not self-evident, the Government admitted as much: "The Court's
ruling would make it impossible for the Government to enforce court orders in a variety
of contexts, including the anti-abortion protests here." Brief for the United States of
America at 31-2; Lynch, 162 F.3d 732.
306. The Second Circuit has issued rulings that at least raise the appearance of
impropriety. For example, in United States v. Arena, 180 F.3d 380 (2d Cir. 1999), the
Second Circuit affirmed Hobbs Act convictions for butyric acid attacks on abortion clinics. The court asserted that "[s]ince the Hobbs Act's concept of property is broad, the
Act's requirement that property be 'obtained' is given a similarly broad construction."
Id. at 394.
But there wvas simply no ground for that assertion. See generally note 86 (discussing
"stealth nullification"). Instead, the court's approach created a vehicle for incorporating that particular panel's legislative preference. This is obvious when the only support
for the court's assertion is a cryptic cite to a 1976 lay dictionary. See Arena, 180 F.3d at
394 (The court wrote: "A perpetrator plainly may 'obtain[ I' property without receiving
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After all, Lynch's precedential value extends far beyond the realm of
abortion access.
So did the abortion "ad hoc nullification" 30 7 machine strike again?
Yes and no. Yes, in the sense that the Government decided to appeal
Judge Sprizzo's decision and was able to curry favor from the dissentingjudges. The Government and the Circuit Court dissenters should
have known, as the NYCLU aptly observed, Jenkins "offer[ed] no solution to the double jeopardy problems inherent in th[e] appeal."3 °8
But ultimately, no. The case was resolved correctly.
Regardless of the influence of abortion politics, though, Judge
Sprizzo's decision, and the Government's subsequent appeal, did raise
three important issues:
1) Does an objectively based religious belief preclude a
finding of willfulness in the criminal contempt
context?

anything, for obtaining includes 'attaining... disposal of,' Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1559 (1976); and 'disposal' includes 'the regulation of the fate...
of something[.]' Id. at 655." (ellipses in original; emphasis added)). The court's definitional dance is further disturbing since the judge apparently knew the correct way to
approach the Hobbs Act construction questions. The same judge decided the "Bill
Cosby case," United States v. Jackson, 180 F.3d 55 (2d Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 196
F.3d 383 (2d Cir. 1999), under the Hobbs Act extortion.
Comparing Arena and Jackson, one commentator lamented:
[In Jackson,] the same judge carefully sifted through the legislative and
common law history of extortion in the Hobbs Act to import a "wrongfulness" requirement into an otherwise silent statute, but ignored that history
completely [in Arena] when constructing "obtain," a word that did appear in
the statute... How the same judge, in cases decided only two days apart, can
analyze extortion in such markedly different ways is not apparent from the
text of the opinions. In fact, the only readily apparent distinction between
the two cases is that one involved a celebrity while the other involved antiabortion protestors[.]
Brian J. Murray, Note, Protesters,Extortion, and Coercion:PreventingRICO from ChillingFirst
Amendment Freedoms, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 691, 738 (1999).
For a thorough analysis of the obtaining property requirement of Hobbs Act extortion and its development in recent years see, G. Robert Blakey and Keven P. Roddy,
Reflections on Reves v. Ernst & Young: Its Meaning and Impact on Substantive, Accessory, Aiding, Abetting and Conspiracy Liability under RICO, 33 Am. CRINi. L. REv. 1345, 1657-75
(1996).
307. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747, 814 (1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
308. Brief for amici curiae New York Civil Liberties Union, et al. at 5, Lynch, 162
F.3d 732 (1998).
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2) May an Article III judge employ a prerogative of leniency when he would otherwise be compelled to
convict?
3) Assuming questions 1 and 2 are answered in the negative, does the Double Jeopardy Clause bar an appeal?
With respect to the first question, at least in the Second Circuit, it
is now settled that religious belief does not preclude a finding of willfulness.30 9 It is unlikely that Judge Sprizzo,3 10 or any other Judge in
the Second Circuit for that matter, will take similar action.
The second question is more difficult to resolve. Whether leniency is the same as nullification is clearly open to debate. 3 1 ' But assuming leniency will be considered the equivalent of nullification,
Judge Cabranes' en banc dissent accurately reflects the import of controlling precedent: leniency is "erroneously seized power."
The third question can be easily answered. The Double Jeopardy
Clause is a complete bar to an appeal from a criminal acquittal, unless
the appellate court is reinstating a previous finding of guilt.
The Lynch case presents facts that would make it easy to say the
dissenting opinions should have prevailed. But justice is not administered in a vacuum. If the standards employed by the panel dissent or
the en banc dissenters were adopted, any acquittal would be ripe for
review. Who is to say when "inferences from [the district court's] subsidiary factual findings"3 12 compel the reversal of an acquittal? No one
can say. No one ought to say. The proper fora for post hoc analyses
or the Judiciary Committee of the House of
are the law reviews
3 13
Representatives.
It is here then, that this comment comes full-circle. Looking outward, one can imagine a procedural rule that, all other things equal,
would allow the government to appeal a criminal acquittal. However,
under the Double Jeopardy Clause that effort must fail unless the appellate tribunal is reinstating a previous finding of guilt. The Double
Jeopardy Clause, written in absolute terms,31 4 protects defendants not
only by its textual absolutism, but also by resisting perversions of its
very underlying principles.
Looking inward, the DoubleJeopardy Clause protected two defendants from a virtual de novo review of the decision of the trial court. It
309.
310.
311.
312.

See Lynch, 162 F.3d 732; Lynch, 181 F.3d 330.
See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 80-86 and accompanying text.
Lynch, 181 F.3d at 336.

313.

U.S. CoNSr. art. I, § 2.

314. U.S. CONsr. amend. V ("No person shall... be subject for the same offence to
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb[.]").

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

makes no difference that, in this case, the review would yield a near
obvious result. The Clause represents, as one commentator noted, "a
prioritization of procedural consistency over individual determinations
of justice."3 1 5 Our system of justice is rooted in procedural protections. If procedural consistency is sacrificed, every individual determination of justice is threatened.
Therefore, when the Double Jeopardy Clause is implicated, there
can be no balancing test; no evaluation of inferences contrary to express findings. Double Jeopardy protections are, and must be,
anchored in bright-line rules which ensure that the Government "with
all its resources and power ... [is] not allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense .... subjecting
him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live
'3 16
in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity.
Sometimes over-quoted precedent loses its luster. But, Lynch's
and Moscinski's anxieties were real.3 17 And liberty, one must not for3 18
get, "finds no refuge in the jurisprudence of doubt."
In light of that, perhaps one telling maxim motivated Judge
Sprizzo, the judges of the Second Circuit, and this author to reach our
conclusions: "Madness in great ones must not unwatcht go." 319 Each
presents a case forjustice; each sees justice perverted by the other. It is
clear, though, that the Double Jeopardy Clause is not malleable to any
individual's fancy. In an absolute sense, it will not allow any defendant
to be "twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."3 2 °
ChristopherJ.Bellotti*

315. Recent Case, Fifth Amendment-Double Jeopardy Clause-Second Circuit Refuses to
Review District Court's Acquittal ofDefendants Charged With Violating Permanent InjunctionUnited States v. Lynch, 181 F.3d 330 (2d Cir. 1999), 113 HARV. L. REv. 1252 (2000).
316. Lynch, 162 F.3d at 737 (quoting United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 370
(internal citation omitted)).
317. And, needless to say the issues herein discussed loom larger than Lynch's and
Moscinski's driveway vigil.
318. Casey v. Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992).
319. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, PRINCE OF DENMARK act 3, sc. 1.
320. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
* The author was involved in the defense of Bishop Lynch and Brother Moscinski after the United States sought en banc review.

